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CLOUDS, CAMERAS, AND COMPUTERS: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES 
I.  Introduction 
It seems to be a common assumption that material places like parks, 
sidewalks, and public squares and “cyber-places” like the Web constitute separate 
locations of communication.  In reality, however, the intersection and collision of 
these two spaces is imminent.  In some respects it has already occurred.  Entire 
cities and counties are erecting wireless “clouds” that will bring the internet to 
vast public spaces.1 Technologies of surveillance continue to proliferate.  What 
one does and says in public places is increasingly subject to surveillance by 
means of a combination of hand-held devices and official surveillance tools like 
closed circuit television cameras (CCTV).2 There may soon be a continuous, 
running record of most public activities.  People in public places are also carrying 
and wearing ever more sophisticated computing devices.  Pervasive personal 
computing is mobilizing communication and affecting public interaction in ways 
we are only now beginning to appreciate.  Among other things, it is blurring the 
line between “private” and “public” communication.  Anyone who has ever been 
stuck in traffic behind a car in which a pornographic DVD is being displayed has 
glimpsed this phenomenon.  Like it or not, the era of “drive-by pornography” is 
now upon us.3
Technology is altering the fundamental character of public places.    
Increasingly, when we are in public, we occupy networked places.4 Some have 
already noted the significant Fourth Amendment privacy concerns raised by the 
 
1 See Sewell Chan, After Delays, Wireless Web Comes to Parks, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 6, 
2006, B1 (reporting plans to provide free wireless access in many New York City parks).  The 
former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia recently became the first country to go completely 
wireless.  Rhode Island has plans to become the first American state to go wireless from border to 
border.  See Jesse Noyes, Rhode Island Plans Statewide WiFi Network, BOSTON HERALD, May 1, 
2006 (available at www.technewsworld.com/story/50262.html).     
2 See Aimee Jodoi Lum, Comment, Don’t Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on a 
Camera Phone: The Need for Privacy in the Public Sphere, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 377 (2005) 
(discussing privacy and public voyeurism laws).  CCTV systems typically involve a dedicated 
communications link between cameras and monitors.  This permits cameras to be viewed and 
operated from a control room. 
3 See, Rachel Leonard, “Dirty Driving” Sore Spot for Legislators, Officers, GoUpstate.com, 
January 12, 2006, available at  
http://goupstate.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060112/NEWS/601120372/1051/NEWS01%2
2 (last visited July 22, 2006). 
4 See Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing:  Embedding the Public Square, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 93, 94 (2005) (“If the line between cyberspace and real space has grown 
increasingly difficult to draw, it may soon become impossible”).  The term “networked” has been 
applied to spaces in other contexts.  Writing specifically about cyberspace, for example, Julie 
Cohen has argued that we are witnessing the rise of a new type of social space, which she calls 
“networked space.”  Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 117 COLUM. L. REV. – (2007).  
This article adapts the concept to emphasize the effect new technologies, including but not limited 
to the internet, will have on public places and public expression.     
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networking of public places.5 These concerns will be exacerbated as the 
technologies of communication and surveillance become more widespread and 
more sophisticated.  The networking of public places will also give rise to a host 
of less-commented upon free speech issues.6 Place is a critical component of 
expressive activity.7 The transformation of material public places into networked 
ones will fundamentally change what it means to speak, petition, and associate in 
public.   
 
This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the First 
Amendment issues related to the networking of public places.  The changes 
brought about by the networking of public places will affect a number of First 
Amendment doctrines and principles.  The Article considers five basic categories 
or clusters of speech issues raised by the networking of public places:  Property or 
public forum, public captivity, protection (from harmful speech), public protest, 
privacy (in terms of both identity and thought), and press.        
 
Having cities and other governmental entities, rather than private interests, 
provide public wireless internet connections raises questions about ownership, 
control, access, and neutrality.  Are these public wireless networks just another 
public utility?  Are they speech forums?  Will governments, or their private 
partners, be able to filter public Web access?  Is there a constitutional right to 
public connectivity and access in the same sense that there is a right to the streets?  
Will governments, or their state-actor private partners, have unfettered access to 
information about public network users?      
 
Public “captivity” will also become a larger concern.  As the drive-by 
pornography example shows, the networking of public places will expose 
audiences to speech in public that has to this point been either entirely private or 
effectively segregated in material places.  Sexually explicit content and ubiquitous 
advertising will be more prevalent in networked places.  Citizens will carry this 
content with them into the networked public square.  We will all potentially be 
more “captive” in networked public places – on buses, in subway cars, in parks 
and government buildings -- to speech that we have generally been able to avoid 
 
5 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 
(2000); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:  Fitting the 
Fourth Amendment To A World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2004).. 
6 For a thoughtful discussion regarding the effects that monitoring urban public spaces may have 
on anonymity, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Dangers of Fighting Terrorism With 
Technocommunitarianism:  Constitutional Protections of Free Expression, Exploration, and 
Unmonitored Activity in Urban Spaces, 32 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 677 (2005).    
7 See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 617-25 (2006) (describing 
the importance of public places to expressive rights). 
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in material public places.8 To what extent can or should the law protect listeners 
and viewers from this expression?   
 
As the captivity problem indicates, exposure to harmful speech in 
networked public places will become increasingly difficult to regulate.  The 
networking of public places will alter the form and character of public expression.  
It will, for example, permit speakers through devices to “virtually” approach 
listeners and viewers.  Networking features will alter time and space, thus 
affecting concepts such as imminence and risk that have been critical to doctrines 
like fighting words, threats, and incitement to unlawful action.  As public places 
become networked, we must consider what form of protection will be available 
when viewers and listeners encounter such things as mobile sexually explicit 
speech, “virtual” harassment, cyber-spamming, and other forms of harmful speech 
in public places.   
 
The networking of public places will also substantially affect public 
protests and demonstrations.  Networking features will facilitate assembly by 
providing platforms for social capital and the means for spontaneous action.  But 
they will also facilitate official and unofficial surveillance, as public and private 
cameras record events in the public square.  On balance, will the networking of 
public places render self-governing activities like protesting and petitioning too 
costly for most citizens?   
 
The devices we carry, outfitted with Global Positioning System (GPS) 
technologies, will facilitate surveillance and tracking.  The networked 
environment will compel us to constantly authenticate ourselves.  Vast public 
areas will be placed under more or less constant surveillance.  In light of these 
things, will the ability to shield speaker or associative identity be fundamentally 
compromised?  Looking somewhat further in the future, will biometric 
technologies, including those that can literally “read” faces, expose even private 
thoughts?  Will digital environments compel us to speak in public against our 
will?   
 
Finally, in a networked environment should every citizen with the capacity 
to record and publish be deemed a member of the “press”?  Should the truthful 
“reporting” of public events by citizen-journalists be shielded by the First 
Amendment from tort and other forms of civil liability, even when it impinges on 
significant public privacy concerns?          
 
8 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that viewers must avert their eyes when 
confronted with offensive speech in courthouse corridors); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 
U.S. 728 (1970) (“no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient”).  
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Serious First Amendment concerns will be raised as the networking of 
public places proceeds.  First Amendment doctrines and principles will be 
challenged by this transformation, just as they have been challenged by 
technological revolutions in the past.  But the stakes of spatial networking are 
actually much higher than these doctrinal concerns indicate.  We are talking 
ultimately about a fundamental makeover of public places.  Although they serve 
many purposes, public places are a collective democratic and expressive concern.  
They facilitate identity and equality claims.  They allow for a wide variety of 
democratic participation.  They lend transparency to both expressive claims and 
regulation of public expression.  While we are considering First Amendment 
concerns, we ought also to ask how networked public places will affect core 
speech values like self-government and civic interaction in the traditional public 
marketplace of ideas.  What will all of this networking do to public places?   
 
The networking of public places will alter the nature, character, and 
democratic functions of public places and public expression.  It will influence 
who speaks, where they may communicate, and what they will say.  It will render 
speakers more knowable to authorities, but in many cases less knowable to one 
another.  People will increasingly interact with devices in public, rather than with 
one another.  Digitization will make some speech, and most speech regulation, 
less transparent to all of us.  All of these changes threaten to render public places 
less capable of serving their traditional democratic functions.      
 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II will describe the networking of 
public places – the technological, social, and environmental changes that are 
transforming material public places.  Part III will address the substantive First 
Amendment issues -- public forum, public captivity, protection from harmful 
speech, protest, privacy, and press -- raised by the networking of public places.  
Part IV will look beyond these doctrinal considerations.  Drawing upon urban 
geography and sociology literature, it will critically examine the civic character of 
networked public places in light of the First Amendment functions and values 
public places ideally ought to serve.  
 
II. Networked Public Places 
 
Much of First Amendment doctrine has developed with regard to a 
material model of public places.  Public expression has taken place in a familiar 
cluster of places, from malls to public squares to public parks.  The first section of 
this Part will describe the general characteristics of public expression in material, 
non-networked public places.  It will also touch upon the principal speech 
doctrines that have developed in this physical environment.  The second section 
of this Part describes the primary network technologies that will or are already re-
shaping public places and public expression.  There are three basic developments.  
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First, governments are currently providing, or partnering with private actors to 
provide, wireless internet access in vast public areas.  Second, governments have 
installed and are continuing to install surveillance equipment, including hundreds 
of thousands of CCTV monitors, in many public places.  Third, individuals are 
carrying and wearing advanced communications technologies in public places.  
These devices will communicate with other devices and with the environment 
itself, which is also becoming embedded with computing devices.           
 
A.  Speech in Material Public Places  
 
In understanding the effect that the networking of public places will have 
on public expression, it is useful to begin with a brief discussion of the expressive 
characteristics that have traditionally defined material public places.  In material 
places, the principles of geography, physicality, anonymity and equality have 
largely determined the contours of public expression. 
 
The geography of material public places consists of bricks, mortar, and 
other tangible features.  This geography provides the basic framework for public 
expression.  In theory, the scope of public speech rights depends upon the 
geographic location the speaker inhabits.  Thus, public streets, parks, and 
sidewalks are “quintessential” public forums in which speech rights are at their 
apex.9 These places have “immemorially” been open for expressive purposes.10 
Most other places may or may not be open to expression, more or less at the 
government’s discretion.11 Under the public forum and time, place, and manner 
doctrines, governments are entitled to maintain public and quasi-public places 
such that they effectively serve their primary purposes.12 The primary purpose of 
most public and quasi-public places – the reason they were constructed – relates 
to concerns other than expression, such as traffic flow, travel, the provision of 
services, or recreation.13 
9 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (describing tiers  
of public fora).  
10 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets 
and parks  
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.”).   
11 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1985) (noting that  
governmental intent is key indicator of forum status and expressive rights in public places).  
the intent requirement).  
12 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (noting that where government acts as proprietor of public places, its 
speech restrictions are not generally subject to heightened scrutiny). 
13 See , e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (noting 
that airport terminal was constructed primarily for travel, not expressive activity). 
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The government’s relationship to geography or place is essentially that of 
property manager or proprietor.  Governments own the streets, parks, and other 
public places, in the sense that they have title to them.  Governments have been 
responsible for providing whatever improvements or upgrades are necessary for 
the continued functioning of these places.  Formally governments have no interest 
in, indeed are forbidden from regulating, the content that is delivered by speakers 
to audiences on the streets, or in the parks, or in other public places.14 
Governments have never had any formal constitutional obligation to facilitate 
expression by building new places for it.  Access to existing forums, however, has 
always been nominally available to all members of the public, regardless of 
means or status.  There have never been “fast” public expression lanes on the 
streets for those with greater means.15 
In their capacity as proprietors, governments have always observed and 
regulated public places.  But they have done so mostly to ensure that a basic sense 
of order and decorum prevails there.  Although there has always been some 
policing of public places, such activities have been subject to realities such as 
limited funding and manpower.  Thus, at any given moment, most public places 
have not been policed at all – in the sense that official eyes are focused upon 
them.    
 
The geography of public places has itself been used to police and regulate 
public expression.  The transmission of obscenity and other illegal content can be 
prohibited altogether, the Supreme Court has held, in order to produce a certain 
“quality of life” and “tone of commerce” in public places.16 The time, place, and 
manner doctrine permits governments to zone or spatially restrict any speech it 
wishes, so long as it does so in a content-neutral fashion and leaves ample 
alternative avenues of communication available.17 In recent years officials have 
become quite expert at this zoning.18 Sexually explicit expression has been 
dispersed or concentrated spatially in order, purportedly, to combat the 
“secondary effects” associated with it.19 Political displays of contention have 
increasingly been subjected to expressive zoning of various forms.20 Zoning has 
 
14 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (describing content neutrality requirement). 
15 Of course, means are never entirely irrelevant.  A speaker wishing to use certain public parks 
must, for example, have the means to pay for a permit fee.   
16 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).  See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973) (defining “obscenity”). 
17 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (time, place, and 
manner regulations must be justified without regard to the content of speech, narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication). 
18 See Zick, supra note – (discussing spatial zoning tactics). 
19 See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning of sexually 
explicit expression). 
20 See Zick, supra note – at 585-606 (describing various spatial restrictions). 
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become a very efficient means of sanitizing large public areas of expression that 
many find quite offensive, harmful, or even just aesthetically distasteful.21 
Geography and spatiality work in this fashion because public expression is 
itself physical, tangible, and grounded.  It has been connected to material places.  
This connection has rendered most public expression open and transparent.  
Confrontations, incitements to action, and demonstrations have generally been 
seen, experienced, and lived events.  This fundamental fact has substantially 
shaped the contours of doctrines typically applied in public speech contexts.  
Threats, for example, require that the recipient have some reasonable fear of 
physical harm.22 A cross burning several feet from a back yard probably suffices 
to create the requisite fear.23 Invitations to brawls (so-called “fighting words”), 
incitements to unlawful actions, and the idea of audience “hostility” all are based 
on elements of proximity, immediacy, and visibility.24 These content categories 
and scenarios can be effectively regulated under circumstances where the speech 
or speech acts can be witnessed, proved, and hence prosecuted.  This was the 
underlying assumption when each of these categories was created.       
 
Of course, the vast majority of public expression is neither illegal nor 
harmful to viewers or listeners.  There is thus no reason to police it.  As we go 
about our public lives, from sitting on a park bench reading a book to engaging in 
assemblies and peaceful protests with others, we expect that we are doing so 
anonymously.25 In public places we are not, of course, anonymous in the sense 
that our identities are wholly private and cannot be discovered.26 But when 
engaged in speech activities in public places, there is at least some minimal right 
not to disclose one’s identity.  Thus, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,27 
the Court invalidated an election law that prohibited the circulation of anonymous 
leaflets in connection with political campaigns.  The retention of anonymity in 
 
21 See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality) (indicating that a content-
neutral ban on all outdoor advertising signs would be permissible). 
22 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (describing “true threats” doctrine). 
23 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (if requisite intent to intimidate victim could be 
proven, a burning cross may constitute a “true threat”).    
24 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words as those 
which “tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 
(1969 (per curiam) (defining “incitement” category); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) 
(upholding disorderly conduct conviction where crowd had become hostile to speaker). 
25 For discussions of the principle of public anonymity, see Slobogin, supra note --, at 237-47; 
Blitz, supra note – at 697-702. 
26 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“[n]o person can have a reasonable 
expectation that . . . his face will be a mystery to the world”); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”). 
27 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
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this circumstance is “a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”28 It can be relied 
upon to “protect unpopular individuals from retaliation – and their ideas from 
suppression – at the hand of an intolerant society.”29 
Further, whether or not we are engaged in core political pamphleteering, 
we still expect that much of what we do in public will remain un-remarked upon 
and unrecorded.  We expect to blend into what Allan Westin has called the 
“situational landscape.”30 One can of course effectively undermine or even waive 
such an expectation.  He may, for example, publicly burn a United States flag to 
garner attention for a cause or message.31 But barring this sort of activity, 
speakers in material public places quite reasonably have assumed that they can 
blend into a crowd.  
 
This expectation has doubtless contributed to the shape of our   public 
expressive culture.  It has provided critical space for difference in public 
expression.  That is not to say that speech in material public places is altogether 
free-wheeling, particularly in light of the proliferation of spatial controls and 
social norms that have limited it.  But our public expressive culture has 
historically been one that has tolerated expression that is disruptive, boisterous, 
loud, and unconventional.  I material public places an expectation of public 
anonymity has provided speakers the freedom to engage in public displays that 
might otherwise have been substantially chilled.     
 
Finally, in terms of general principles, material public places have 
historically been equalizing or leveling forces.  Those lacking the means for more 
sophisticated expression have tended to use the facilities of public places to 
convey messages that might otherwise have been silenced by market forces.  
Many “poorly financed causes of little people” have relied upon places like 
streets, sidewalks, and areas surrounding facilities like airports, train stations, and 
public buildings to garner attention and convey messages.32 In this sense and 
others public places and public expression have played a critical democratizing 
role in our society.  Note, again, that because this expression has been tangible 
and public, it has been quite difficult to ignore.  At the least, public places have 
 
28 Id. at 357 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT1, 3-4 (R. MCCALLUM  ED. 1947)). 
29 Id.
30 ALLAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967).  See Blitz, supra note – at 683 
(remarking on public anonymity and the “freedom to fade”). 
31 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating state law prohibiting the desecration of 
the flag).  
32 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).  See generally Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and 
Speech:  The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439 (2006) (discussing importance 
of place to marginalized speakers and their expressive activity).    
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provided “little people” an opportunity to interrupt the daily routine of public life 
and to force some consideration of their claims.              
 
The elements of geography, physicality, anonymity, and equality have 
substantially shaped the nature and tenor of our public expressive culture.  As the 
next section shows, the networking of public places will affect each of these 
elements.   
 
B.   The Networking of Public Places 
 
As mentioned, there are three primary features associated with the 
networking of public places.  The first is the establishment, by governmental 
entities, of vast public internet access networks.  The second is the continued 
proliferation of surveillance devices that continuously record public activity.  And 
the third is pervasive and mobile personal computing in public places.  This 
process of spatial networking will fundamentally change how information is 
conveyed, shared, and received in public places.  It will alter the manner in which 
public places are policed and regulated.  It will challenge and strain each of the 
fundamental precepts of material public places – geography, physicality, 
anonymity, and equality -- discussed above. 
 
1. Wireless Clouds – “Muni WiFi” 
Urban “hot spots,” where anyone with the proper device could connect to 
the internet, have been around for years.  Some of the earliest wireless fidelity 
(“WiFi”) networks were patched together by internet anarchists bent on creating a 
wireless commons.33 Other early WiFi networks were the result of corporate-
sponsored initiatives, meant to draw people to Starbucks and other quasi-public 
places, and keep them there.  For the first time, people were able to stay 
connected even while outside the home or office.     
 
These were relatively small-scale experiments.  But the early projects 
forecast an imminent intersection of so-called “cyberplaces” and material places 
on a much grander scale.34 As the proprietors of vast public places, including 
many rural ones where internet connectivity was spotty or simply non-existent, 
governments eventually became interested in providing WiFi to their citizenries.     
 
Wi-Fi is now draped over vast areas of public space.  More than 200 cities, 
counties, and regions are currently providing or planning to provide some form of 
 
33 See generally Kevin Werbach, Supercommons:  Toward A Unified Theory of Wireless 
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004) (explaining concept of the commons). 
34 For a critique of the notion that “cyberplaces” constitute actual places, see generally Cohen, 
supra note --  
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public wireless internet access.35 Increasing areas  are now covered with wireless 
“clouds” or “meshes,” as the networks are often called.  For example, Suffolk 
County on Long Island has installed a network that will reach some 1.5 million 
people and cover 900 square miles.36 Philadelphia’s new WiFi network will 
cover most of the city’s approximately 135 square miles.  San Francisco is taking 
bids for an ambitious WiFi project.  New York City has already installed wireless 
“hot spots” in many of its vast park areas.  New clouds are rising over cities and 
suburbs every day.  Indeed, entire states aspire to become unified wireless 
communications networks.37 
Muni WiFi networks will provide public access to the internet – in parks, 
squares, public buildings, airport terminals, and literally wherever else citizens 
can carry their remote computing devices.38 Some networks, like New York’s, 
will provide free connectivity, at least for now.  Other municipalities, concerned 
about expenses associated with developing and operating the wireless networks, 
plan to charge citizens for access.  Some, like San Francisco, even plan to offer 
“premium” connectivity for a fee, while relegating free users to a much slower 
connection speed.     
 
There may be enormous educational and expressive benefits to Muni 
WiFi.  In many rural communities, Muni WiFi will help close the digital divide.39 
It will enable activities like distance learning, coordinated policing and other 
public services, and the provision of vast amounts of information to citizens.  
Despite these benefits, Muni WiFi has been a controversial undertaking.  Until 
now, the provision of internet access has primarily been a private venture.  
Bowing to pressure from the telecommunications industry, fifteen state 
legislatures have prohibited municipalities from offering public WiFi access.40 
35 For a lost of the cities and regions that have developed muni WiFi plans or already have 
operational networks, see http://muniwireless.com/municipal/1227/ 
36 Id.
37 See Jesse Noyes, Rhode Island Plans Statewide WiFi Network, Boston Herald, May 1, 2006 
(available at www.technewsworld.com/story/50262.html).     
38 Although some municipalities have proposed offering access for free, perhaps supported by 
advertising revenue, the vast majority of the networks are subsidized.  Some cities, like San 
Francisco, propose tiered access, with low-speed available for free and higher-speed access 
available for a fee.   
39 See Tim Gnatek, “Switchboard in the Sky:  Municipal Wi-Fi Helps Fill Gaps In the Digital 
Map,” The New York Times, May 3, 2006, G1.      
40 A map of the various Muni WiFi projects and state laws designed to limit them is available at                                                                
http://news.com.com/Municipal+broadband+and+wireless+projects+map/2009-1034_3-
5690287.html?tag=nl. The bills are described at http://muniwireless.com/municipal/579.
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Congress is currently considering proposed legislation that would institute a 
nationwide ban, although the prospects for enactment appear slim.41 
The principal arguments against Muni WiFi are based on efficiency 
concerns and the purported lack of need for the service.  Telecom interests 
contend that there is no shortage of supply or market gap to fill.  Supporters of 
Muni WiFi suggest that the bottom line is the bottom line:  Telecom companies 
want to provide public wireless access and reap the profits.  On the merits, 
supporters argue that Muni WiFi is simply another utility -- like electricity, roads, 
sewers, and water – that government should provide.  Some, like San Francisco’s 
Mayor, Gavin Newsom, have argued that internet access is a “fundamental right” 
for the modern citizen.     
 
Whatever the merits of the economic and rights arguments, efforts to stall 
or prevent the spread of Muni WiFi appear to be going nowhere.  Public access to 
the internet is already or will become a reality in most large urban centers, an 
increasing number of suburbs, and many rural areas that have thus far been under-
served in terms of internet access.   
 
Consideration of the full effects of Muni WiFi on public places and public 
expression must await a description of the remainder of the process for 
networking public areas.  I will return to some of the themes sketched here in 
Parts III and IV.  But one can readily surmise some of the effects wireless clouds 
may have on the public expressive environment.   
 
Wireless clouds will alter the fundamental geography of material public 
places.  To some extent they bring us closer to exploding the very concept of 
“place” itself.  Cyberspace scholars often speak of the Web and other venues as 
separate “virtual” spaces.42 But with public wireless access and other pervasive 
computing technologies, as described below, where one happens to be will 
become far less important to one’s ability to communicate.  To some extent terms 
like “online” and “offline” will cease to matter.           
 
On-the-ground expression will be affected by wireless clouds floating 
above public places.  The clouds will facilitate mobile communication and public 
information access.  In networked public areas, private and public speech will mix 
and blend, as people bring the Web with them into public places.  As a result, 
geography and place will become less reliable tools for restricting access and 
 
41 There are dueling proposals in Congress.  One proposal would overturn the fifteen state bans, 
allowing municipalities and other state subdivisions to undertake WiFi projects.  See “Community 
Broadband Act of 2005, ” S. 1294, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (2005).    
42 See Cohen, supra note --. 
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exposure to information that is harmful, offensive, or simply irritating.  The Web 
will spill into public places.   
 
The manner in which public speakers and audiences interact will also be 
affected by all of this cloud cover.  Tangible and physical forms of expression 
will be replaced by virtual communications of various types.  We are already an 
increasingly distracted people in public areas.  Add to the cell phone and the MP3 
player mobile devices that connect with the internet no matter where in public one 
happens to be, and people will be even more likely to engage devices rather than 
one another.  The noise of the streets and parks will be replaced more and more 
by quiet concentration on personal screens.  The very sights and sounds of public 
expression will change.  
 
Wireless clouds will facilitate official and unofficial surveillance of public 
acts, including expression, association, and information-gathering.  This will 
threaten public anonymity.  Will the books or newspapers I am reading “online” 
as I sit on a park bench be recorded?  Will my associations arouse suspicion?  
Will I even know?          
 
The participants in public speech rituals and displays may also change.  
For those without personal computing devices, with no access or perhaps very 
slow access, the nature of public places will become that much more alienating 
and foreign.   The digital divide some experience at home will now go public, 
with new classes of haves and have-nots in public areas.43 Public places may thus 
be less of an equalizing force.    
 
2. Surveillance Square 
Surveillance of public and quasi-public activities is not a new 
phenomenon.  Private and quasi-public places have been under the camera’s 
watchful eye since at least the late 1950s.44 Banks were very early adopters.  
They used closed circuit television networks (CCTV) to monitor their vaults and 
their customers.  Other commercial places, like malls and department stores, have 
also long placed customers and spaces under surveillance.45 
Two things, however, are very different in the modern era.  The first is the 
prevalence of public surveillance, in terms of both the numbers of cameras and 
 
43 On the scope of penetration of innovative technologies into low-income urban areas, see 
generally HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES: PROSPECTS FOR THE POSITIVE 
USE OF ADVANCED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Donald A Shon, et al. eds., 1999). 
44 Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You’re On Candid Camera:  Privacy and Video Surveillance,
31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1997). 
45 Id.
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the quantity of space they cover.  The second is the technology itself, which 
enables surveillance that differs vastly in quality -- that is, in the degree of its 
potential intrusiveness -- from past generations.   
 
Surveillance technology has become a mainstay of quintessentially public 
places like streets, city centers, and parks.  The proliferation began in the streets, 
as officials sought new and efficient ways to police street crime.46 Municipalities 
have long trained cameras on high-crime areas.47 They later used camera 
technologies for other purposes, for instance to cheaply and efficiently monitor 
traffic and issue citations for traffic violations.      
 
Heightened security concerns, especially since the attacks on September 
11, 2001, have led to the further proliferation of public surveillance.48 The United 
States has not yet reached the surveillance heights of Great Britain, “the champion 
of CCTV surveillance” with between two and three million public cameras in 
operation.49 But we are merely at the start of developing a surveillance society.  
Already hundreds of thousands of CCTV cameras are watching over our public 
places.  One scholar has suggested that video surveillance will likely “increase 
exponentially in the next decade.”50 
As one might expect, surveillance has recently become more prevalent in 
cities that may be at greatest risk from terrorist attacks.  New York City has just 
begun to install and operate an extensive public surveillance system.51 The city 
plans a first installment of 500 cameras, at a cost of $9 million, with more to 
follow depending on the amount of funds received from the federal Department of 
Homeland Security.52 Ultimately the plan is to have several thousand wireless 
video cameras positioned atop lamp posts and on public buildings.  New York 
 
46 See generally Raymond Surette, Video Street Patrol:  Media Technology and Street Crime, 13 
POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 78 (1985). 
47 Id. The primary official justification for these extensive official surveillance systems has been 
crime detection and prevention.  There is a serious debate concerning whether this justification is 
empirically defensible.  See Slobogin, supra note -- at 224-230 (surveying evidence on crime 
prevention and deterrence). 
48 There are also many privately maintained and operated video surveillance systems that are 
trained on public spaces.  Many of the video feeds from these cameras can be linked to publicly 
operated surveillance systems.  See Slobogin, supra note -- at 222. 
49 Id. at 222.  British experience with CCTV has been extensively scrutinized.  For a review of the 
literature, see Stephen Greenhalgh, Literature Review of Privacy and Surveillance Affecting Social 
Behavior (August 2003) (on file with author).   
50 Slobogin, supra note -- at 219.  See also Simon G. Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy:  
How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 150 (Phillip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds. (1997) (estimating 
20-30% annual increase in public video surveillance). 
51 See Tom Hays, Associated Press, NYPD Employs First of 500 Security Cameras, April 16, 
2006, available at http://www.officer.com.
52 Id.
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City officials envision a “ring of steel” in parts of Lower Manhattan, one that 
resembles the plan recently implemented in London’s financial district.  The 
public surveillance plan is not limited to Manhattan.  It calls for placing 
surveillance cameras throughout the five boroughs.53 Surveillance of 
underground public areas is also already widespread.  New York City now has 
1,000 cameras in its subway system, and expects to have over 2,000 in place by 
2008.54 
The District of Columbia has also experienced a rapid rise in public 
surveillance.  Large areas in and around the capitol are under the jurisdiction of 
both local and federal authorities.  The Metropolitan Police Department has a 
relatively modest public surveillance program.  In 2002, for example, police used 
nineteen automated surveillance cameras to watch anti-war protests and a “March 
for Life” event.55 The police department’s cameras are located in areas 
throughout the National Mall and surrounding areas.  They target especially those 
places where marches and protests typically occur.     
 
The National Park Service also operates surveillance cameras in and 
around various federal properties in the District, including the National Mall.56 
Unlike the D.C. surveillance system, which so far has been used primarily during 
large public events, the Park Service’s system is always operational.57 Thus if 
you are near the White House, for example, or the Vietnam Memorial you are 
under surveillance.   
 
Other large urban areas are increasingly implementing large-scale public 
surveillance projects.  Chicago recently spent $5 million on a 2,000-camera 
system, one of the nation’s most extensive.  Washington and Philadelphia have 
made similar investments.  The phenomenon is not limited to large cities, 
however.  Municipalities like Tampa, Florida and Memphis, Tennessee, and even 
smaller places all have recently invested in public surveillance programs.58 As 
Department of Homeland Security grant money continues to flow to communities 
 
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See Derrill Holly, Police Surveillance Cameras to be Used During Washington Protests,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at www.commondreams.org, December 21, 2002.  
56 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives, Video Surveillance:  Information on Law 
Enforcement’s Use of Closed Circuit Television to Monitor Selected Federal Property in 
Washington, D.C. (June 2003). 
57 Id. at 15.  The District is considering authorizing daily use of surveillance cameras in certain 
areas.  See Gary Emerling, District Will Be Looking At You, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 16, 
2006. 
58 See Slobogin, supra note -- at 220 (Newark, N.J., Tampa, Fl., Virginia Beach, Va., and 
Memphis, Tenn., all have cameras, ranging in number from six to seventy-two, that cover large 
areas of public real estate”). 
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across the country, CCTV systems will likely become more and more prevalent in 
public areas.   
 
The latest generation of surveillance cameras has exceptional capabilities.  
Most have panning and tilting features.  Some have zoom lenses “that can read 
the wording on a cigarette packet at 100 yards and bring nighttime images up to 
daylight level.”59 More advanced systems have features like motion detectors, 
facial recognition, biometric technology, and even see-through capabilities.60 The 
records these machines create is also different.  Older technologies relied on 
conventional videotape for information storage.  Newer CCTV technology relies 
upon digitization.61 This makes it easier to store information for much longer 
periods of time.   
 
These advances are remarkable.  As one organization recently put it,   
“[w]hat was once the grist of science fiction novels is quickly becoming the 
reality of modern law enforcement.”62 With these surveillance technologies, it 
will be possible for authorities to identify, trace, and continually track a person 
the moment he enters the public square.63 It will be possible to read what each 
citizen is reading, to see who he sees, to know where he has been and perhaps 
where he is going.  It may at some point be possible to literally read his face, in 
the sense of learning from facial expressions.  Much of this monitoring will be 
automated.  The cameras will not operate in isolation.  Along with public wireless 
networks and, as explained below, pervasive personal computing, they will be 
merely one aspect of a larger information network embedded in public places.  
The information collected will not merely disappear once the person leaves the 
public square.  It will be retained.  It may become part of a digital dossier.      
 
The proliferation of public surveillance raises serious privacy concerns.  In 
terms of public expression, these developments may change the geography of 
public space by marking off vast areas that will now be under public surveillance.  
Officials will no longer be limited to policing expression that they happen to 
 
59 Id. at 222.    
60 Id. at 223. 
61 Id.
62 The Constitution Project, Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance:  A Guide To Protecting 
Communities And Preserving Civil Liberties (2006), available at www.constitutionproject.org .
63 In the UK, officials are preparing to initiate Celldar, a project that will permit surveillance of  
individuals based on the signals emitted from their cellphones.  The system will allow officials to 
watch vehicles and individuals almost anywhere and any time, from up to hundreds of miles away.  
See Jason Burke and Peter Warren, How Mobile Phones Let Spies See Our Every Move,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, October 13, 2002, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/mobile/article/0,2763,811034,00.html.
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witness on the scene and in real time.  A less transparent but more efficient spatial 
regulatory regime will facilitate continuous policing of public areas.64 
Even if citizens do not know the details of surveillance, they will know 
that they are being watched.  This may affect the books they read in public, the 
protests they are willing to participate in, and the displays they are willing to take 
part in while in public places.  Of course, the expectation of public anonymity will 
be undermined, if not entirely eliminated.  The choice to reveal oneself, and one’s 
actions, will no longer be the speaker’s.          
 
In terms of equality, certain “undesirable” populations, like the homeless 
or public agitators, may be displaced from certain areas.  Those without the 
proper digital identification may be prevented from entering areas of the public 
square at all.        
 
3. Pervasive Computing and Mobile Technologies 
There is, finally, one additional feature that completes the networking of 
public places.  This element is perhaps the most critical to public communication 
and interaction.  Networked places will not only have clouds hovering over them 
and cameras watching activity in them.  The architectures of public places will be 
embedded with digital tags and networked information.  Professors Jerry Kang 
and Dana Cuff call this already ongoing phenomenon “pervasive computing.”65 
Pervasive computing “is what happens when the Internet gets ubiquitous, 
embedded, and animated.”66 Professors Kang and Cuff describe the expected 
result of this embedding process:  “Imagine not a robot, not an isolated and 
identifiable device, but a world saturated with networked intelligence.”67 
The digitally saturated world will give rise to new communicative forms, 
facilitate social networking, and produce a flow of environment-to-person 
communication not possible in inert material public places.  The devices people 
carry with them or wear – personal computers, personal digital assistants, mobile 
 
64 Despite the privacy and other implications of extensive CCTV use, at this point there is very 
little transparency in the adoption or use of the technology.  Some municipalities have disclosed 
the location of their surveillance cameras.  But other institutions, including the National Park 
Service, have not made this information public.  See GAO Report, supra note -- at 16.  Few laws 
or regulations currently govern public CCTV use.  Public participation in its adoption has been 
minimal.  The Park Service, for example, has never sought public comment on its use of CCTV in 
areas of the National Mall.  Id. at 4.  Few municipalities have developed comprehensive controls 
for the use and operation of public surveillance, including protections for private data collected as 
a result of surveillance.   
65 Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing:  Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 93 (2005). 
66 Id. at 94. 
67 Id. at 95. 
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telephones and devices not yet conceived -- will facilitate both person-to-person 
and person-to-place communication.  Social interaction, including expressive 
activity, may change dramatically when, as Kang and Cuff put it, “a digital 
nervous system is grafted into the material world.”68 
In terms of expressive liberties, perhaps the greatest promise lies in the 
power the networked place will have to enhance social networking.  As political 
scientists and sociologists have noted, contentious displays and social movements 
require social capital and coordinated action.69 The internet is already filling 
some of the gaps in otherwise frayed social networks.70 Once in public places, 
protesters and demonstrators will be able to take advantage of pervasive networks 
to create smarter and more spontaneous assemblies.  They will be able to use their 
personal devices to tactically assemble all at once, in places that are most 
effective.   
 
This phenomenon has been referred to as “swarming.”71 Even when it 
was limited to technologies of text messaging, swarming proved to be a powerful 
weapon of political dissent.  During the 1999 World Trade Organization protests 
in Seattle, activists relied upon mobile phones and public networking to thwart 
some official efforts at repression.72 With public internet access now becoming 
widely available, swarming will likely migrate to the Web.  Anyone with a 
connection will be able to participate, across media, seamlessly.             
 
Smaller assemblies might also form as a result of pervasive and mobile 
communications devices.  Digitized tags and global positioning satellite (GPS) 
intelligence that we carry on our person will notify contacts in our vicinity of our 
precise location.73 This could lead to spontaneous gatherings, as people quickly 
find one another in real time and real places.  Through personal computing 
devices, we will also be able to leave digital trails of information to be found by 
those who come after us.  The networked environment may become a dynamic 
digital bulletin board.     
 
68 Id. at 112. 
69 See, e.g., BERT KLANDERMANS, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROTEST 15-16 (1997) 
(explaining processes of protest formation). 
70 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (noting the decline in social networks and social 
capital). 
71 See RHEINGOLD, supra note --, at Chapter 7 (describing public swarming and its effect on 
political environments around the globe). 
72 See id.
73 See Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 104 (“For instance, when you enter the shopping mall, all 
friends in your social  network who are nearby can be buzzed.”). 
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On a more retail or personal level, hand-held devices will enable strangers 
to learn bits of information about one another in public places.74 Devices will 
“read” one another, allowing for a form of virtual personal reconnaissance.  
Bluetooth technologies will allow for “virtual” approaches and communication 
with those occupying the same public spaces and using similar devices.75 Right 
now, these opportunities are limited to those using similar devices, sharing the 
same network.  But this phenomenon may someday extend beyond the similarly 
networked.  One can already imagine a world in which each person has access to 
the same pervasive network.        
 
Person-to-environment communication will be a frequent occurrence in 
networked public places.  People will not merely traverse public places; they will 
interact with them.76 The physical environment “will be able to respond directly 
to what it senses.”77 As a speaker walks past a certain public place, she may 
receive an automated flow of information about conditions, directions, or dangers 
in that place.78 She may automatically receive advertisements for products near 
that place, based on a geographic reading of her hand-held or worn device.79 The 
flow of information will go in two directions.  People will be able to communicate 
back to the environment, to interact with it.80 Networked public places will 
become mobile marketing ecosystems..
Pervasive personal computing will also render each citizen a mobile 
recording unit.  The cell phones they carry will enable not only photography but 
uploading of streaming video.  Personal surveillance has already been a useful 
tool for protesters, who have used their own record of events to contradict what 
has been put forward by police as the “official” record of events on the street.  But 
there is a larger issue here.  Pervasive computing devices will make “on the 
scene” reporting by citizens a much more common event.  Projects currently 
underway will create spaces on the Web that will act as public clearinghouses for 
 
74 See id. at 110 (“PDA-sized gadgets that provide this sort of datasense about fellow conference 
attendees have already rolled out.”) 
75 Bluetooth technologies facilitate the exchange of information between personal devices like cell 
phones and the connectivity of personal computing devices in close proximity to one another.  See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth.
76 See John Markoff & Martin Fackler, With a Cellphone As My Guide:  Digital Search Meets the 
Real World In the Streets of Japan, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 28, 2006 at C1 (describing 
phones that combine satellite technology with wireless web as “a missing link between cyberspace 
and the physical world”).  
77 Kang & Cuff, supra note -- at 94. 
78 This will be made possible largely by the proliferation of embedded radio frequency 
identification (RFID) tags.  See id. at 97-98 (describing RFID technology). 
79 See id. at 110 (“As you pass by a commercial center, you receive a visual notice on your 
dashboard that your favorite brand of shoes is on sale . . . “).   
80 Kang and Cuff raise the possibility that public billboards may actually change content 
depending on who happens to be passing by a location.  Id. at 112.  
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photos, videos and “reporting” sent in by citizens all over the world.81 When we 
are in public, we will be watched not only by officials but by an army of “citizen-
journalists” too.          
 
The digital nervous system and personal computing appendages attached 
to it will alter fundamental features of material public places.  The geography will 
no longer merely be something we stand or walk upon.  We will interact through 
and with it.  As noted above, the mobility of expression will confound efforts to 
spatially regulate it.  As public speech becomes more and more digital and virtual, 
it will lose its traditional tangible and physical character.  Listeners and viewers 
will communicate via an additional sense, what Kang and Cuff call a 
“datasense.”82 Virtual expression and “datasensing” will be more difficult to 
police, in part because it will not be physical and visible.   
 
In addition, the mobile technologies we carry or wear will allow us 
constantly to be identified and “authenticated” as we pass through physical 
places.83 Public anonymity will be further diluted.  The basic choice whether to 
speak will no longer be completely our own.  It will be automated, in some sense 
a product of our consent to carrying or wearing the latest devices as we travel 
around in public.  As noted, some carrying those devices will be able to “report” 
on the acts of others, adding another layer of public surveillance.  Finally, in 
terms of the traditional equality of material places, only the digitally privileged 
will be able to participate fully in networked public places.  The digital nervous 
system will be possessed only by those who possess the latest technologies.  The 
new have-nots will not only be missing a critical hardware and computer 
connections.  They will lack an increasingly critical sense – a “datasense” -- as 
well. 
 
III.   Freedom of Expression In Networked Public Places 
 
This Part translates the geography, physicality, anonymity, and equality 
concerns raised by the networking of public places into explicit First Amendment 
concerns.  Most of the commentary, in legal and social science communities, has 
centered upon the effect surveillance technologies will have on privacy rights.84 
Cameras are only a single feature of a much larger and more sophisticated 
 
81 See Mark Glaser, Stanford Fellow Imagines Every Cell Phone As Citizen Media Outlet, July 18, 
2006, available at http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2006/07/digging_deeperstanford_fellow.html .
A mockup of the site is available at www.InTheFieldOnline.net.
82 Id. at 110. 
83 Id. at 106. 
84 Professors Kang and Cuff do adopt a somewhat broader perspective.  As discussed in Part IV, 
infra, they examine the implications of pervasive computing for the health of the public sphere 
generally.  See Kang & Cuff, supra note --, at 115-121.  See also Blitz, supra note – at 697-702 
(discussing First Amendment anonymity concerns related to public surveillance). 
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network, however.  The “digital nervous system” is, or at some point will be, an 
integrated system.  Surveillance cameras will be linked to public Web access.  
Mobile data tags will be linked to surveillance technologies.  Personal computing 
devices will link to the environment, to other devices, to surveillance networks, 
and to various information clearinghouses on the Web.  The progression to 
networked public places will affect a variety of First Amendment principles and 
doctrines.   
 
A.  Property:  The Legal Status of Wireless Clouds 
 
Large-scale municipal wireless projects have been greeted as either   the 
unremarkable provision of an important public utility or an unnecessary and 
unwise interference with traditional private provision of Web access.  Mostly 
ignored so far have been the serious free speech concerns that arise as 
governments step in to provide access to a critical communicative medium like 
the internet.   
 
In terms of the provision of communicative infrastructure, Muni WiFi 
clouds are unprecedented.  How ought we to conceptualize the wireless clouds 
hanging over public areas?  We might view the provision of public internet access 
as analogous to the provision of water, electricity, or other public utilities.  In one 
sense the analogy has some merit.  As they have in other public goods contexts, 
governments are stepping in and providing, or partnering with private entities to 
provide, a critical public infrastructure.  This is what happened with electricity 
and sewers.  Internet connectivity, one might say, is fast becoming as critical to 
the modern citizen as these other services.  Governments thus naturally ought to 
provide the service of public connectivity. 
 
Ultimately, however, this analogy to public utilities is fundamentally 
flawed.  For one thing, there is already a flourishing private market for the 
provision of internet access.  At least in many urban and suburban areas, a 
network of hot spots has been developing for some time.  With private providers 
seemingly in no short supply, one might wonder if there is really some market 
failure to correct.  As a matter solely of economics, then, there may be sound 
reasons for governments to stay out of the internet connectivity market.   
 
But the analogy to other public services suffers from a much deeper flaw 
than market economics indicate.  Simply put, electricity and sewage are nothing 
like the information that will flow as a result of wireless clouds and meshes.  
Governmental provision of electricity, for example, raises no serious 
constitutional concerns.  Assuming the service has not been entirely privatized, 
thus removing constitutional concerns, governments must merely refrain from 
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inequitable provision of services and satisfy basic due process requirements.85 
But Muni Wi-Fi is no ordinary public utility in this regard.  For the first time, 
governments (and in some cases their private partners as state actors) will provide 
and control the backbone of a communications network over which vast amounts 
of public communications will flow.  This invokes an altogether different 
analogy.  Putting wireless clouds in the sky is like building a public road solely 
for communicative purposes.  This is much more akin to providing an expressive 
forum than a mere public utility.   
When governments provide access to information through such forums, 
First Amendment issues of access and content control inevitably arise.  Wireless 
clouds will likely raise similar issues.  Suppose, for example, a municipality is not 
willing to provide unfettered connectivity.  As noted, the Web defies the sort of 
spatial control that material places often facilitate.  Owing to its architecture, 
access to the Web is not partial.  How long will it be before concerned citizens or 
groups object to public provision of access to pornography, or hateful expression, 
or morally offensive materials?  How long before suspected terrorists are tracked 
through the public network?  Or suppose a citizen claims a right of access to the 
portal site to convey a message.  Does she have a right to post information there?         
 
Although the scope of Muni Wi-Fi projects is unprecedented, this is not 
the first time that government has provided internet access in a public place.  Nor 
is it the first time it has confronted issues relating to internet access control.  By 
2000, ninety-five percent of public libraries were offering internet access, most 
through a federal funding program.86 When public libraries installed their internet 
connections, the entire Web flowed into the library space, much as Muni WiFi 
will introduce the Web to larger public areas.  Reports of adults and children 
accessing sexually explicit materials in public libraries, and of patrons exposing 
others to this material, quickly began to surface.87 When this situation came to 
Congress’s attention, it enacted the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which 
required that libraries take steps to prevent access to obscenity, child 
pornography, and materials deemed harmful to minors on pain of loss of certain 
federal funds.88 
The libraries sued, arguing that filtering patron access was an infringement 
on patrons’ First Amendment rights and undermined their own mission to provide 
 
85 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that due process 
and equal protection claims could not be brought against a private utility).  
86 See United States v. American Library Assn., 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003). 
87 See id. (describing evidence of patron access).  A much fuller account of public library 
experiences with internet access can be found in the opinion of the three-judge panel.  See United 
States v. American Library Assn., 201 F.Supp.2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
88 Children’s Internet Protection Act, 114 Stat. 2763A-355, 20 U.S.C. §§ 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) and 
(B)(i); 47 U.S.C. §§ 254 (h)(6)(B)(i) and (C)(i). 
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access to the widest possible range of information.89 In United States v. American 
Library Association,90 the Supreme Court dismissed these arguments.  It noted 
that public libraries had always exercised discretion in selecting collection 
materials, and that sexually explicit materials have historically not been found on 
their shelves.91 Moreover, the Court noted that neither the library’s collection nor 
the Web itself is a “forum” for expressive purposes.92 The internet, the Court 
noted, was of far too recent vintage to be considered a “quintessential” public 
forum like a street or park.93 Moreover, according to the Court libraries do not 
provide internet access to encourage the dissemination of a variety of viewpoints; 
they do so for the same reasons they provide access to other materials, namely for 
education, research, and recreation.94 Thus no speaker could claim a right to use 
the library’s internet service to reach a public audience.               
 
What does the library experience suggest about the legal and constitutional 
status of governmentally installed wireless clouds?  As the Court noted in the 
library context, the Web itself cannot be deemed a “traditional” public forum 
because this resource is simply too new to have been “immemorially” held in trust 
for the use of the public.95 Governmental provision of internet access is yet 
another circumstance that highlights the inflexibility of the Court’s rules for 
categorizing public places.96 Through Muni WiFi programs, the internet is fast 
becoming a resource held “in trust” for public communicative activity.  Under 
current doctrine, however, the wireless clouds do not create a traditional 
expressive forum.   
 
It is more likely that by providing a link to the internet, municipalities are 
displaying the requisite intent to establish a “designated” public forum for the 
exchange of a diversity of ideas and information.97 Unlike public libraries, 
municipalities have not historically exercised editorial discretion in terns of the 
content conveyed in public places.  Indeed, they are generally forbidden under the 
First Amendment from taking the content of expression into account.  And unlike 
libraries, municipalities are providing the connection to encourage the 
 
89 American Library Assn., 539 U.S. at 210-11. 
90 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  The author wishes to disclose that he worked on this case on the  
government’s behalf in the lower courts.  
91 See id. at 205 (“Public library staffs necessarily consider content in making collection decisions 
and enjoy broad discretion in making them.”). 
92 Id. at 206. 
93 Id. at 205-06. 
94 Id. at 206. 
95 See International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) 
(limiting category of traditional public forums to streets, sidewalks, and public parks).   
96 See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note – at 456-59(describing primary criticisms of 
public forum doctrine). 
97 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1985) 
(government much make affirmative choice to open a “designated” public forum). 
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dissemination of a variety of viewpoints.  Thus, any municipal filtering of public 
internet access would have to meet the highest standard of judicial scrutiny.98 
Even if a municipality could convincingly argue that it had a compelling 
interest to filter, for example to protect children from public exposure to certain 
materials deemed harmful to minors, it is doubtful that any sufficiently tailored 
means for serving that interest could be fashioned.  Filters are certainly far more 
technologically advanced today than they were a decade or more ago.  But no 
filter can currently screen solely illegal content from the Web, leaving the 
remainder undisturbed.99 Under the statutes regulating internet access in public 
libraries, patrons can simply request that a librarian unblock a website if they 
were denied access.100 However workable this sort of system might be in the 
limited public space of the library, it cannot be used in vast public areas.  Who 
would decide whether to unblock a site?  On what basis?  Pursuant to what 
procedures? 
 
Nor will any citizen likely prevail in asserting an access claim to the 
public Web portal site.  Assuming advertising or other speech does not appear 
there, the portal site likely would be deemed a non-public forum. Municipalities 
could thus prohibit private expression there.  Use of the network will be protected; 
use of the portal will not be.     
 
Having created a forum with its wireless clouds, a municipality will have 
no choice but to provide the entirety of the Web in public places.  The Web 
“library” will spill into the public square, just as it flowed into the public libraries.  
Exposure to expression that might once have been the province of home-bound 
devices has already begun to raise privacy and public captivity concerns.  We 
shall turn to these next.       
 
B.   Public “Captivity” 
 
The ubiquity of the Web, combined with pervasive and mobile computing 
devices, will alter accepted notions of private and public expression.  We may 
become “captives” to public expression we may not wish to see or hear.  
Technologies like mobile phones and other personal devices will thrust speech on 
unwilling audiences in public places, on the streets, on buses and subways, and in 
parks.   
 
98It is unlikely that municipalities will create a right of access for speakers to any home or 
registration page they use as a portal.  Unless governments open that space to diverse expression, 
the homepage would likely constitute a non-public forum, a resource generally under 
governmental control.    
99 See American Library Assn., 201 F.Supp.2d at 449 (noting that filters routinely block innocuous 
materials). 
100 See 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (disabling of filter permitted for adults and minors).  
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Some of this expression will be sexually explicit.  Cell phone providers 
are already providing pornographic content in other countries; the U.S. market is 
not far behind.101 This will make it possible to view sexually explicit content 
virtually anywhere, any time.  Several complaints have already arisen when 
drivers were subjected to pornographic DVDs playing in nearby cars, which are 
clearly visible especially during evening hours.102 As well, new forms of targeted 
advertising or spamming that rely upon the GPS features in personal devices will 
bombard an already advertising-saturated public.103 Will the First Amendment 
permit any reprieve from these potential nuisances?   
 
The First Amendment provides some limited protection for the “captive” 
listener or viewer who cannot reasonably avoid unwanted expression.  Just as 
there are rights to see or hear expression, there are corollary rights not to see or 
hear.104 The right to be let alone is most vigorously enforced when the listener or 
viewer is in the home, owing to the strength of the privacy interest in that place 
and the practical difficulties of avoidance.105 New technologies always pose 
distinct problems in terms of their ability to thrust content into places like the 
home.  In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,106 for example, the Supreme Court upheld 
federal regulations prohibiting the broadcast of “indecent” expression over the 
airwaves during certain hours of the day when children and unwilling adults 
might be listening.  The Court reasoned that radio broadcasts of indecent 
expression were akin to an “assault” from which homeowners were entitled to 
some protection.107 Similar reasoning was recently invoked by courts to uphold 
the federal “Do Not Call Registry,” which prevented most telephone solicitors 
from disturbing people while at home.108 
101 See Gary Strauss, Cell Phone Technology Rings in Pornography in USA, USA TODAY,
December 12, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/services/2005-12-12-
pornography-cellphones_x.htm.
102 See Associated Press, Playing at an SUV Near You: Porn, March 11, 2004, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/11/national/main605394.shtml (reporting incidents of 
pornography displayed in vehicles).   
103 For a discussion of the problem of unsolicited email correspondence, or “spam,” see generally 
Adam Mossoff, Spam – Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERK. TECH. L. J. 625 (2004).     
104 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (recognizing limited right not to 
receive information).  See also Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy:  Is There A Right Not to 
Be Spoken To?,. 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153 (1972) (discussing doctrine of captivity).  
105 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1985) (discussing private captivity cases).  Even 
in the home, a viewer or listener must often resort to self-help, such as by depositing objectionable 
mail in the waste basket.  Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Svc. Commn., 447 
U.S. 530 (1980).    
106 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
107 Id. at 748-49. 
108 See FCC v. Mainstream Marketing Svcs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 855 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 
(upholding federal “do not call” registry). 
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In public places, however, self-help is the primary means of protection 
from unwanted expression.  The listener or viewer is generally expected to avert 
her eyes to public expression she does not care to see or hear.  In Cohen v. 
California,109 the Court held that viewers in public courthouse corridors could 
protect themselves by averting their eyes from Cohen’s offensive jacket, which 
was emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft.”110 In Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville,111 the Court invalidated an ordinance that would have banned all 
nudity in outdoor movie theatres.112 The audience, even while driving on the 
public highways and thus potentially (and quite dangerously) distracted by the 
display, was required to turn a blind eye to what appeared on the screen.113 
The networking of public places will challenge fundamental notions of 
“public” and “private.”  The mobility of private forms of expression will render it 
increasingly a matter of public concern.  When public places are networked, it 
may become increasingly difficult to maintain a basic level of public repose.  The 
“assaults” may come from many directions at once.  Private, offensive expression 
will move closer and closer to unwilling or undecided audiences.  The nudity on 
the outsize public movie screen will appear on the screen in the car sitting in 
traffic in front of you.  The pornographic magazine will be digitized and 
transported onto the subway or bus, or into a public park, airport terminal or other 
public place.114 
One would expect (or at least hope) that social norms and decorum would 
prevent the most intrusive encroachments on others’ public tranquility and repose.  
But if some drivers are willing to view sexually explicit material in the car on a 
public road or in a parking lot, what will stop them from doing so in other public 
places?115 Carrying explicit magazines into public places like buses and parks is 
 
109 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  
110 Id. at 21. 
111 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
112 Id. at 213. 
113 In one instance the Supreme Court did embrace something like the right to be let alone in a 
quintessential public forum.  In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), the Court upheld an 8-foot 
bubble between abortion clinic sidewalk counselors and clinic patrons on public sidewalks.  Id. at 
726-27.  In that context, the Court said, a woman was entitled to some protection for her 
psychological repose.  Id. at 717-18.  The Court has shown no inclination to extend the right to be 
let alone to other public areas, however. 
114 For those who doubt the possibility, the author offers one personal anecdote.  Recently, sitting 
in a café, I witnessed a patron viewing a pornographic website on his laptop in full view of other 
patrons, including several children.  The parents quickly removed the children.   The adults, 
including the author, pretended not to notice. 
115 The limits of reliance upon social norms are apparent on the subways.  In New York City, there 
have been several recent arrests for sexually menacing behavior like flashing.  See Anemona 
Hartocollis, Women Have Seen It All on Subway, Unwillingly, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 24, 
2006, A1 (reporting incidents of flashing and groping on city subways).  
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quite different, in social terms, from transporting it by way of personal computing 
devices.  The latter have already achieved a substantial degree of public 
acceptance.  They are fast becoming human necessities.  They are part of the 
public environment.            
 
Right now, the doctrine or principle of captivity offers very little 
protection for the unwilling recipient of public expression.  But cases like Cohen 
and Erznoznik were decided before mobile content devices proliferated in public 
places.  These decisions were products of a model of public expression based 
upon material, not networked, places.  That model generally facilitated a spatial 
segregation of offensive expression no longer possible in networked public 
places.  The question is whether the networking of public places counsels a 
change in principle when it comes to public captivity.   
 
Although it has been reluctant to grant the unwilling audience broad rights 
to be let alone in public, the Court has indicated that the matter requires “delicate 
balancing.”116 On the one hand, new technologies will make it easier to thrust 
expression into the visual and auditory fields of unwilling audiences, including 
children, affecting the tranquility and livability of public places.  On the other 
hand, we are becoming all too proficient at filtering out the background and 
foreground noises of everyday life.       
 
Cases like buses and subway cars remain most problematic, given the 
difficulties of escaping unwanted speech and the reliance upon these modes of 
transportation by many people.  But one might surmise that few today would be 
as distressed as Justice Douglas was in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak117 at 
the prospect of radio transmissions being piped onto public buses.118 Douglas, in 
dissent, strongly objected to the invasion of public privacy and repose brought 
about by these transmissions, in no small part one should note because the 
government had something to do with their content.119 Today’s rider may not 
even hear such transmissions, so ensconced is she in her own technological 
bubble.  One might also suspect that our sensibilities, including our expectations 
with regard to public repose, have changed dramatically since the 1950s.  Justice 
Douglas’s outrage was in some sense a product of his times.  Modern citizens’ 
tolerance for the thrusting of expression is likely much higher, by sheer necessity, 
than that of generations past.   
 
We have not yet reached a point where freedom of expression must give 
way to a generalized right of repose or tranquility.  But this may change 
 
116Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. 
117 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
118 See id. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
119 See id. at 469 (likening program to a form of mind control). 
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depending on our experiences in networked public places.  The Supreme Court 
has, at least in one context, supported the right of listeners to be let alone in public 
places.120 There are already laws under consideration that would criminalize the 
display of sexually explicit images in cars.  Whether the push for new laws to 
protect the unwilling listener or viewer will be more widespread is impossible to 
know at this point.  From a normative perspective, however, it does seem rather 
incongruent for the people to simultaneously disappear into personalized bubbles 
and at the same time demand legal protection from expression they do not wish to 
see or hear.                
 
Sex will not be the only speech thrust upon citizens in networked public 
places.  The same basic calculus applies to aggressive advertising or what might 
be referred to as “public spamming.”  Pervasive computing will open up new 
possibilities for consumer targeting, including advertisements based upon the 
recipient’s present geographical location.  The environment itself will 
communicate offers to passersby.  Many of these communications will be 
unwanted, in the sense that the recipient did not directly solicit them.   
 
Concerns about aggressive or manipulative advertising arise with each 
new generation of technologies.  In the 1970s, for example, concerns were raised 
about Madison Avenue tactics that might be subsumed under the heading 
“subliminal advertising.”121 The email spam that stuffs our daily inboxes is only 
the latest example of commercial exploitation of new technologies.  Public 
spamming would merely be the natural “next generation” of this phenomenon. 
 
The differences, however, between previous instances of aggressive 
advertising and what may become large-scale public spamming rest both on 
notions of place and technological self-help.  Private spamming and harassing 
advertising are particularly troublesome because they invade the home.  As noted, 
however, we enter the public sphere with a very limited expectation of privacy.  
In public places, we are already bombarded with commercial advertisements.  As 
distasteful as some of these pleas are, as long as they are not false and misleading 
they are protected expression.122 Although their time, place, and manner of 
delivery can be regulated if sufficiently important reasons warrant, they cannot be 
prohibited.  Just as we daily exercise selective attention and memory to deal with 
 
120 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 702, 730 (2000) (noting strong public interest in protecting  
repose of abortion clinic patrons).  
121 See generally Nicole Grattan Pearson, Subliminal Speech:  Is It Worthy of First Amendment 
Protection?, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 775 (1995).  See also Olivia Goodkin & Maureen Ann 
Phillips, The Subconscious Taken Captive:  A Social, Ethical, and Legal Analysis of Subliminal 
Communication Technology, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1077 (1980-81). 
122 See Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (holding that commercial  
speech is protected by First Amendment).   
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those ads, so too will we have to learn to ignore digitally delivered ads while we 
are in public places.   
 
This assumes, of course, that the advertisements ever reach us.  If we do 
not wish to receive them, we will presumably find a way to program our personal 
devices to filter them out.123 Or we will walk away from the place that is 
facilitating the transmission.  Or, if one can imagine such a thing, we will simply 
turn the device off.  Increasingly the power of avoidance will lie precisely where 
the power of delivery does – in the technology we hold in our hands or wear on 
our bodies.        
 
The networking of public places will bring vast amounts of previously 
“private” expressive content into public view.  Barring some rather serious 
doctrinal reconsideration, which at this point seems unlikely and probably in any 
event unnecessary, we will likely have to tolerate more offensive and aggressive 
forms of public expression in networked public places.  Self-help, in terms of both 
social practices and technological solutions, will be the primary recourse when 
unwanted expression intrudes on the privacy and repose of unwilling audiences.    
 
C.   Protection:  Dangerous, Offensive, and Harmful Speech Activity 
 
Public captivity raises an even larger concern with respect to the presence 
of harmful or dangerous speech in networked public places.  As noted in Part II, 
in material public places expression – and its regulation --   tends to be tangible 
and physical.  Assuming some minimal advance notice, a listener or viewer can 
generally avoid speech by avoiding the speaker, or the place.  The tangibility and 
visibility of expression in material places also facilitates its official regulation.  
Doctrines like true threats, fighting words, harassment, and incitement are based 
on a material model of public places and public expression.  Expression in 
networked public places is already beginning to lose its tangible and physical 
characteristics.  What protection will there be for audiences, and the public at 
large, from harmful expression in networked public places that is digitally 
conveyed?         
 
New technologies invariably give rise to new forms of annoying and 
harassing expressive behavior.  There may in fact turn out to be a number of 
annoying and embarrassing applications of new technologies in networked public 
places.  For example, there have been public voyeurism issues related to recent 
uses of personal cameras in public places.124 Today it is relatively easy to take a 
 
123 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003) (discussing private 
programming of communications technologies to cater to personal interests). 
124 See H. Koskela, Video Surveillance, Gender and the Safety of Public Urban Space:  “Peeping 
Tom” Goes High Tech?, 23 URBAN GEOGRAPHY 257-78 (2002).  
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photograph of a person in public, perhaps doctor the image in any number of 
ways, and post it immediately on a Web site for all to see.  Soon a single device 
like a cell phone will serve all of these purposes at once.  
 
More seriously, in networked public places it may soon be possible to 
approach a recipient virtually, perhaps anonymously.  Devices will “introduce” 
themselves to other nearby devices.125 Along with public spamming we may see 
new forms of harmful speech.  We may encounter an updated “virtual” version of 
the sidewalk harassment that occurs with disturbing frequency in material public 
places.126 The public audience may also be vulnerable to an even more pernicious 
form of harassment that we might call “public cyber-stalking.”127 This is not, 
admittedly, a current problem in part owing to Americans’ relative slowness in 
adopting new peer-to-peer technologies.128 But consider that a mere decade ago, 
few had even heard of “cyber-stalking.”  As a result of some pervasive online 
misconduct, today many states have laws that purport to protect unwilling 
recipients from harassing, annoying, and even embarrassing online 
communications.129 What, if any, protection can or should the law provide from 
new forms of harmful expression produced by and in networked public places?130 
There are obvious constitutional problems with protecting any of us from 
merely “annoying” or “embarrassing” expression, as some cyber-stalking laws 
purport to do.131 The networked public environment will often be an annoying 
 
125 For example, one recently introduced Bluetooth technology called “Proxidating” notifies a user 
when a potentially compatible mate is nearby.  See 
http://www.proxidating.com/index.php?code_pays=US (“Imagine, you are crossing the street 
when the girl/boy of your dreams passes before you, your phone buzzes and their face appears on 
your phone’s screen.”).  
126 For a recent study of sidewalk harassment, see LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS:
LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC SPEECH (2004). 
127 Cyber-stalking is the use of communications devices to stalk another.  See 1999 Report on  
Cyberstalking:  A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry, available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm.
128 Americans have been less apt to adopt peer-to-peer technologies like Bluetooth systems than, 
say, Japanese citizens.  But if the cost of these technologies decreases, as expected, we may see 
substantial changes in communicative habits in public places.  See RHEINGOLD, supra note – at  
22-24 (discussing economic and cultural influences).  
129 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech from the Listener’s Perspective, 1996 UNIV. OF CHI.
LEGAL FORUM 377 (describing and analyzing cyber-stalking laws). 
130 Connectivity has created difficulties in the workplace as well.  See David T. Bower, Note, 
Make It Stop Or I’ll Sue!:  The Feasibility of a Hostile Work Environment Claim Created By 
Sexually Explicit Spam, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1577 (2005) (noting rising problem of sexually explicit 
workplace spam).  
131 See Volokh, supra note – at 380-81 (discussing vagueness and overbreadth problems with 
many cyber-stalking laws).  See also Joshua Azriel, First Amendment Implications for Email 
Threats:  Are There Any Free Speech Protections?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 845 
(2005) (discussing First Amendment implications of regulating email threats). 
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place to be.  Opportunities for public embarrassment will rise as cameras capture 
public events.  But assuming the communication is delivered through an online 
medium, with the requisite intent and the effect of causing a reasonable fear of 
harm, existing statutes would appear to provide at least one possible means of 
redress for the victim of public cyber-stalking.  There is no reason to limit 
application of these statutes to instances in which the victim is in the home or 
workplace when she receives the communications.  The harm is the psychological 
damage the fear engenders, and that fear may be even greater in an open public 
place where the victim may be more physically exposed and vulnerable.  So long 
as the victim knows or reasonably fears she is being stalked, the statutes should 
apply.132 
The concerns with public cyber-stalking are not ultimately legal but 
pragmatic ones.  Even with ubiquitous CCTV and other forms of surveillance, the 
likelihood of real-time official intervention is quite slim.  Technological advances 
are also making proof of these offenses increasingly difficult.  A sustained stream 
of communication to one’s home or work computer may produce a record of 
evidence sufficient to identify, arrest, and prosecute a wrongdoer.  But a quickly 
delivered and perhaps encrypted strike in a public place, or even a series of them, 
will be difficult to trace, track, and police.  Now add one more twist to our public 
cyber-stalking scenario.  It is currently possible to send “self-destructing” virtual 
communications -- messages that explode and essentially disappear shortly after 
they are received.133 Under these circumstances, proof and prosecution under 
threat or other safety laws will be most difficult if not altogether impossible.               
 
It would seem that, as in material places, the merely annoying and 
embarrassing will either have to be tolerated or policed by social norms and self-
help mechanisms.  The recipient or target of harassing expression in networked 
public places will have at her disposal substantial means of self-help.  She might 
of course leave the park, mall, or other place.  But as occurs in some real-space 
harassment and stalking, she may be followed.  Or she may reset her device’s 
receipt protocols to block any further messages from the particular speaker.  This 
may be the best defense against at least some forms of public cyber-harassment.  
We should not, however, overlook the potential costs associated with this 
particular form of self-help.  Taking the most extreme defensive stance, for 
example, each person could effectively create a “white list” of persons from 
which they will accept messages in any public place.  This would protect the 
listener from unwanted messages, but only by effectively isolating her from 
public communications she might have actually desired to receive.       
 
132 See Frazer v. Delco Electronics Corp., 263 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The stalking victim  
who doesn’t know she is being stalked is not in fear of  being injured.”). 
133 See http://networks.silicon.com/mobile/0,39024665,39154995,00.htm (explaining that email 
self-destructs within 40 seconds of receipt). 
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It would thus seem that as in the case of public captivity audiences will 
mostly have to resort to self-help and other private means of avoidance when 
confronted with harassing expression in networked public places.  According to 
some recent studies, this is apparently as Americans would prefer things.  Survey 
results indicate that in many cases the public seems to prefer that norms rather 
than laws be used to regulate problematic expression.134 One would expect that if 
given the option, these respondents might also prefer technological solutions to 
legal ones.             
 
Virtual harassment and cyber-stalking are only two forms of harmful 
speech that may occur in networked public places.  The examples demonstrate the 
common difficulty with protecting any of us from digitally conveyed expression 
in public places.  Other dangerous or harmful expression, including “true threats” 
and “fighting words,” raise similar issues of pragmatics and proof.135 Virtual 
threats and fighting words are not generally going to be witnessed events, in the 
sense that no material manifestation of them will occur and no public audience 
will experience them.   
 
Moreover, these doctrines were developed with the imminence of real 
space and time in mind.  Can one reasonably fear a threat delivered in a text 
message, with no further action taken?  Can one invite a brawl through a text 
message?136 Ultimately, as was true when stalking went online, it may be 
necessary to rethink or perhaps redefine the elements of these content categories 
to fit the new circumstances of networked public places.  Or, alternatively, the 
networking of public places may provide further evidence that these categories 
are unworkable in a modern world in which the forms and mechanisms of 
communication are rapidly changing.             
 
Nowhere are the effects of networking on space and time likely to be more 
felt than with regard to the content category “incitement to unlawful action.”  To 
constitute incitement, a communication must be “directed to inciting or producing 
 
134 See The Information Society Project, Yale Law School, Public Opinion and Freedom of 
Speech, July 14, 2006, at 3 (White Paper available at 
http://research.yale.edu/isp/papers/ISP_PublicOpinion_fos.pdf.) (noting that respondents prefer 
social norms to legal responses with regard to problematic expression).  See also NIELSEN, supra 
note – (same conclusion with regard to sidewalk harassment).        
135 See Black; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (defining fighting words as those which “tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace”). 
136 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 114 (1980) (describing fighting words as a  
“quite unambiguous invitation to a brawl”).  See also Sanjiv N. Sing, Cyberspace:  A New 
Frontier For Fighting Words, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 283, 317  (1999) (examining 
psychological and physical injuries occasioned by online fighting words).  
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imminent lawless action and [] likely to incite or produce such action.”137 What 
exactly does “imminence” indicate in networked public places?   
 
The incitement doctrine, like many others, developed under conditions in 
which speakers and audiences were located in the same place.  Wireless 
networking and pervasive computing erase spatial boundaries; these features can 
bring people together with remarkable speed and efficiency.  As noted in Part II, 
mobile computing devices have the potential to facilitate assembly and collective 
action.  The dark side of this, of course, is the power these devices have to 
facilitate collective acts of terrorism.138 
On the one hand, most internet communications would seem to fail the 
imminence test.  Internet communications can certainly lead to punishment for 
threatening speech, at least where tangible physical harm actually occurs in 
material places.139 But in terms of incitement in particular, the nature of internet 
communications is such that words on the Web are not generally delivered 
instantaneously to the audience.140 Here, however, is one place where the 
intersection of material and cyber-places may matter.  The requisite imminence 
and risk of action may not have been present where a potential lawbreaker, sitting 
at his desktop in a pre-networked environment, posted a message on a Web site 
encouraging the like-minded to “move on City Hall.”  But imminence and 
likelihood of harm may need to be calculated differently in a networked public 
environment.  The networked speaker may be communicating from afar, while the 
threat on the ground from “swarming” and other coordinated activities may be 
both real and imminent.  With always-on public Web access, co-actors would 
have instantaneous access to the speaker’s instructions and encouragements.  
Their mobility and access to shared information networks would significantly 
raise the risk of collective action.   
 
The line between “incitement” and mere encouragement has always been 
somewhat hazy.  Recent terrorism prosecutions appear to be pushing the limits of 
the imminence requirement under Brandenburg’s classic articulation of 
incitement doctrine.  Suspects are being arrested prior to taking any substantial 
action toward perpetrating a crime, sometimes for little more than discussing their 
 
137 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
138 For this reason officials must seriously consider whether providing wireless Web access on 
subway trains and other public facilities might facilitate future terrorist attacks.   
139 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding damages award against organizations that 
published names, addresses, and other personal information relating to abortion providers on web 
site). 
140 See John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment:  The Framework for an  
Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 428-29 (2002) (noting “imminence” 
problem with regard to internet communications).  
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hatred for the United States or the possibility of some future attack.141 New types 
of criminal activity like terrorism, coupled with new technologies like wireless 
networks and personal computing devices, need not necessarily change the 
definition of “incitement.”  But they may well affect the delicate balance the 
doctrine requires officials and courts to maintain.  The qualities of space and time, 
which help separate “preemptive” and illegitimate acts and sanctions from lawful 
ones, will be less and less reliable indicators in networked places.  Plausible 
arguments for stretching the scope of the “imminence” standard will arise as 
public places become networked.            
 
The imminent melding of cyberspaces and material spaces will raise 
fundamental questions about doctrines developed to police expression that has up 
until now been mostly material, physical, and visible.  Personally harassing and 
offensive expression will likely have to be dealt with through self-help 
mechanisms.  Larger public safety threats may involve a reconsideration of 
concepts such as imminence and preemption.  To police incitements and threats 
that cannot be seen or heard will require ever more sophisticated surveillance 
capabilities and activities.  As discussed below, this surveillance will raise 
substantial First Amendment concerns of its own.     
 
D.   Protest:  Assembly, Association, and Anticipatory Conformity   
 
Pervasive surveillance will make it possible for authorities to know of 
matters in advance, and thus to act preemptively.  The technologies of 
surveillance are not only proliferating but becoming more and more powerful in 
terms of their capabilities.  As a result we may no longer assume that we are 
blending into a public environment.  Our activities, our associations, perhaps 
someday even our public thoughts may be discovered.142 
Public surveillance raises Fourth Amendment privacy concerns.143 But 
there are serious First Amendment considerations as well.  Depdnding on its 
ultimate form and scope, public surveillance may have substantial adverse effects 
on public expressive liberties.  In terms of public expressive displays like protests 
and demonstrations, two general burdens will likely be imposed.  First, there may 
be a chilling of associative rights.  If assemblies are routinely watched and their 
activities recorded, it may be that speakers will be less likely to join in certain 
 
141 See Eric Lipton, Recent Arrests in Terror Plots Yield Debate on Pre-emptive Action by 
Government, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 9, 2006, at A11 (reporting on recent terrorism plots and 
arrests). 
142 If we follow the course taken by Great Britain, then it will one day be unusual not to have our 
public activities recorded.  See CLIVE NORRIS & G. ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CCTV (1999) (estimating that more than 300,000 cameras may film an 
individual in Britain each day). 
143 See generally Slobogin, supra note --; Blitz, supra note -- . 
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public causes.  Second, there may be a chilling of expressive behavior.
Sociologists, philosophers, and legal theorists have examined the phenomenon of 
“anticipatory conformity,” in which actors engage in self-restraining behavior 
when they believe they are being watched.144 Given the nature of their expressive 
repertoires, political activists and other dissenters may disproportionately 
experience these effects.     
 
Some have suggested that the mere existence of public surveillance 
cameras may violate the First Amendment.145 Under current doctrine, however, 
there are severe obstacles to such a claim.  The most significant obstacle to a First 
Amendment claim based on the mere existence of public surveillance is Laird v. 
Tatum.146 In Tatum, the Court held that a challenge to an Army covert 
surveillance program that tracked the activities of certain civil rights protest 
groups raised a non-justiciable controversy.147 The surveillance program’s 
existence was not in dispute.  But none of the alleged victims could demonstrate 
that they had suffered any cognizable injury as a result of being watched.  The 
Court acknowledged that a First Amendment violation might arise from 
something short of a direct prohibition on the exercise of First Amendment 
rights.148 But the “chilling” effect it had recognized in prior cases, the Court said, 
involved exercises of governmental power that were “regulatory, proscriptive, or 
compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively 
subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions he was challenging.”149 
Tatum suggests that any broadside by political groups or activists against 
general public surveillance programs is likely to fail.150 In Tatum authorities were 
attending public meetings and gathering information from news accounts.151 
Only the means of collecting information has changed.  As in Tatum, only public 
information is being collected under known official surveillance programs.  Of 
course, more serious concerns might be raised if specific groups or individuals 
 
144 See Slobogin, supra note – at 243-44 (discussing research on anticipatory conformity). 
145 See id. at 252-53 (“one might argue for a First Amendment right to be free of the inhibiting 
effects of camera surveillance in public unless the government can proffer some justification for 
it.”); Blitz, supra note – at 697-98 (noting chilling effect on public urban speech activities and loss 
of anonymity).       
146 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
147 Id. at 11. 
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Courts of appeal have rejected several attacks on public surveillance programs based on  
Tatum. See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 510 F.2d 253 
(2d Cir. 1974); Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 
1335 (3d Cir. 1975).    
151 Tatum, 408 U.S. at 6. 
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were somehow targeted for public surveillance without sufficient cause.152 The 
result might also be different if authorities were some day to link features of the 
network, for example to access private Web or other electronic information about 
persons or groups who are gathering in public.      
 
The mere existence of surveillance cameras situated in public places, 
however, would not seem to surpass Tatum’s jurisdictional hurdle, much less 
demonstrate a First Amendment violation.  This will likely remain the case so 
long as courts continue to view the harm or injury from pervasive surveillance as 
minimal and, what is more important, non-regulatory.
It is not difficult to imagine that pervasive surveillance at places like the 
National Mall may have serious chilling effects on public protest activity, both in 
terms of limiting associations and encouraging the “anticipatory conformity” of 
public expressive behavior.  The same effect might be imagined in public squares 
and parks across the country.  But imaginings are not concrete harms.  What is 
required -- if plaintiffs are to remain in court, and to have a chance of success -- is 
a much stronger scientific showing that such effects actually exist.153 
As the technologies of surveillance become more sophisticated, research 
on their expressive effects must keep pace.  There is already a body of research 
examining the societal effects of pervasive surveillance.154 Many criminologists, 
urban geographers, and sociologists have concluded that public surveillance (a) 
does not serve to reduce crime, (b) excludes certain populations from public areas, 
and (c) reduces tolerance for “difference,” including unconventional (but not 
illegal) behavior.155 These findings and conclusions raise substantial First 
Amendment concerns.  At this point, however, there is insufficient research to 
convincingly demonstrate that constant surveillance amounts to a form of 
“regulatory” harm.  It must be shown that the networked environment actually 
prevents or substantially discourages speakers and assemblies from engaging in 
public expressive activities.  Even with such a showing, however, the 
government’s response will be that the threat of terrorism is a compelling reason 
to put public areas under surveillance.  That concern has already caused courts to 
loosen restrictions on political surveillance.156 
152 See Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Tatum where 
protesters alleged that targeted surveillance caused harm to reputation).  See also Slobogin, supra 
note -- at 255-56 (noting that some courts have distinguished Laird where targeted surveillance 
affects membership or other specific group activities). 
153 See Slobogin, supra note – at 246 (noting “small amount” of evidence thus far generated to 
prove the effect). 
154 See infra notes – and accompanying text. 
155 Slobogin, supra note – at 246. 
156 See Handschu v. Special Services Div., 273 F. Supp.2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (removing some  
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There is little doubt that pervasive public surveillance will affect the 
exercise of public liberties.  The present challenge is to demonstrate these effects 
concretely, in a manner that satisfies Tatum. We have a sociological expectation 
of blending in avoiding constant scrutiny while in public places.  Right now, 
however, we have no enforceable legal or constitutional right of this sort.        
 
E.  Privacy:  Identity, Thought, and Compulsory Speech    
 
Political activists and protesters will have a difficult time convincing 
courts of their right to avoid public scrutiny.  What about the public solicitor, 
pamphleteer, or solitary speaker?  A speaker’s right to communicate anonymously 
in public may be compromised by identity-exposing surveillance.  Network- 
facilitated intrusions may someday make it possible for authorities to know a 
person’s thoughts, for example by knowing what Web sites she has visited while 
in public areas or even, as technology becomes more sophisticated, “reading” the 
face.  Digitized environments may compel speakers to announce their identities 
and other information.  Do any of these things violate the First Amendment?    
 
Protection of one’s identity is an aspect of the First Amendment’s privacy 
guarantee.  Recall that in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n157, the Supreme 
Court held that there was at least a limited right to communicate anonymously.158 
Given the power of today’s surveillance technologies, it is certainly conceivable 
that in the future the right to anonymous pamphleteering could be violated in 
several ways.  Cameras might reveal personal, identifying information from 
distances of hundreds of feet.159 As it develops, facial recognition technology 
may also reveal one’s identity to authorities.  In a future public environment, a 
speaker may be forced somehow to “authenticate” himself – by digital tags on his 
person or objects -- before being permitted to enter a particular public place.   
 
All of these things would disclose a person’s identity to authorities, at 
times while she is engaged in protected speech.  But McIntyre would only seem to 
protect identity in the hypothetical case of the exposed pamphleteer.  The decision 
does not protect any generalized right of speakers to disguise or conceal their 
identities while in public.160 Rather, it protects the right to publish one’s views 
 
restrictions on surveillance); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 
2001 (same).  
157 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
158 Cf. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, 536 U.S. 150, 169 (2002)  
(invalidating  ordinance that required door-to-door solicitors to disclose their identity).  
159 See Slobogin, supra note – at 222. 
160 See, e.g., Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 211 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding New York’s  
ban on wearing masks in public places).  
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anonymously.161 Identity is protected, in other words, not for its own sake but in 
connection with the act of publishing some message or view of the author.  The 
author wishes to publish those views in such a manner that viewers remain 
unaware of her identity, whether for fear of reprisals or for expressive effect.162 
So long as governments do not regulate identity by prohibiting 
dissemination of non-anonymous messages, McIntyre would appear to provide no 
relief to those whose identity is merely exposed as a result of public surveillance.  
This does not mean that the loss of anonymity will have no effect on public 
expression and public life more generally.  At this point in time, however, First 
Amendment conceptions of privacy do not encompass a general right to conceal 
one’s identity while in public places.                  
 
More disturbingly, the networking of public places may also someday 
make it possible for authorities to intrude on the private thoughts of citizens.  The 
First Amendment protects a private realm of thought, including what books we 
read, what Web sites we choose to visit, and what beliefs we hold.163 Certain 
networking features will implicate this aspect of expressive privacy.   
 
Municipal involvement in the operation of public WiFi systems may 
endanger this aspect of First Amendment privacy.  Again, the experience of 
public libraries that provide Web access may provide some insight.  Librarians 
have been vigorously resisting official requests made under the PATRIOT Act for 
patron library records.164 The librarians have been defending the rights of their 
patrons’ liberty to access information without fear of governmental surveillance 
of their reading habits.  They seek to protect patrons’ First Amendment rights to 
free inquiry and thought.   
 
The libraries are well positioned, institutionally and as a matter of their 
basic mission, to resist such requests.  Suppose, however, that a municipality 
providing or partnering with an Internet Service Provider to provide public WiFi 
receives credible information concerning a terrorist organization or an individual 
 
161 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (“The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the  
literary realm.”).  
162 Id. For these same reasons, courts have protected the rights of internet speakers to maintain  
anonymity in connection with the publication of their views.  See Blitz, supra note – at 704-05  
(discussing cases and drawing analogy between public space anonymity and internet anonymity).  
See also Lee Tien, Whose Afraid of Anonymous Speech?  McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 117 (1996).  
163 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“The right of freedom of speech and 
press includes not only the right to utter or print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the 
right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought . . . “).  
164 See, e.g., Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Ends a Yearlong Effort to Obtain Library Records Amid 
Secrecy in Connecticut, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 27, 2006, at B6. 
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believed to be implicated in a terrorist plot.  If the municipality is the sole 
provider of wireless internet access, what will prevent it from monitoring or 
accessing the records of that organization or person?  If it is providing access in 
partnership with a private service provider, will the provider feel pressured to turn 
over such information -- in some cases without a subpoena?  If the Web 
constitutes a “library” of information, records of what one is searching ought to be 
protected regardless of the place in which the search occurs – in the home, in a 
library, or on a public bench.        
 
A more literal interference with private thoughts may occur in  fully 
networked public places.  The First Amendment does not permit governments to 
punish anyone for merely thinking bad thoughts.165 Next generation facial 
recognition programs may offer a window into a person’s private thoughts.  Facial 
recognition software, which has been used at major sporting and other public 
events, maps the details and ratios of facial geometry using certain algorithms.  
The most prevalent of these is the “eigenface,” which is composed of 
“eigenvalues.”166 The current technology has substantial error rates.167 But future 
generations of this technology will no doubt be more accurate in identifying 
individuals and reading their faces.   
 
Suppose the technology existed to permit officials to canvass a crowd, 
focus on a specific person identified as a potential threat of whatever nature, and 
calculate his eigenvalues.  To make the matter more concrete, suppose a paroled 
child predator appears at a public park where several children are playing.168 
Suppose further that the predator has done nothing in terms of approaching the 
children or otherwise acting on whatever impulses he may have.  But his 
eigenvalues, captured on a public surveillance camera, reveal that he is so 
inclined.169 
Is there a basis for preemptively arresting the predator if these measures 
strongly indicate some fantasy or other invidious proclivity toward the children in 
 
165 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating ordinance that purported to 
punish racist thoughts); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (state “cannot 
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts”). 
166 See A. Selinger and D.A. Socolinsky, Appearance-Based Facial Recognition Using Visible and 
Thermal Imagery:  A Comparative Study (2002), available at 
http://www.equinoxsensors.com/publications/andreas _ face.pdf). 
167 See U.S. Department of Defense Counterdrug Technology Development Program Office, 
Facial Recognition Vendor Test 2000 Evaluation Report, Feb. 16, 2001, available at 
http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/facialrecognition/DLs/FRVT_2000.pdf.
168 The hypothetical is based on the facts of Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004). 
169 Malcolm Gladwell has provided an account of the work of psychologist Paul Ekman regarding 
facial signaling.  See Malcolm Gladwell, The Naked Face:  Can You Read People’s Thoughts Just 
by Looking at Them?, gladwell.com, Nov. 29, 2002, available at 
http://www.gladwell.com/2002/2002_08_05_a_face.htm. 
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the park?170 Under current doctrine the answer to this last question would appear 
to be “no.”  The predator may be arrested for the acts he commits while in a 
public place, but not for what he merely happens to be thinking while there.  Until 
now this matter has not been one of serious concern.  Governments, after all, 
cannot read citizens’ minds.  But as one commentator has noted:  “Current 
research blurs the line between biometrics and mind reading.”171 Like our 
identities, our thoughts may be exposed in future networked environments.  
Technology will make thoughts more and more accessible to authorities.   
 
Finally, speakers in networked public places may often be compelled to 
speak in the sense of identifying and authenticating themselves.  Suppose, for 
example, that as a condition of access to some public place the government 
requires that a machine must read a compulsory identification card.  The First 
Amendment protects the right not to be compelled to express thoughts and beliefs 
against one’s will.172 The hypothetical compulsion here does not, however, 
compel the stating of any belief, creed, or thought.  It is more akin to the sending 
of an administrative email, an act the Supreme Court recently found not to 
implicate the First Amendment’s ban on compelled speech.173 Such a system 
would be more akin to regulating conduct – in this case entry – than speech, 
thought, or belief.     
 
The networking of public places will strain currently recognized rights to 
maintain speaker anonymity.  It will facilitate the surveillance of records 
indicating private interests and preferences.  It may ultimately expose the thoughts 
of public citizens.  And it will compel authentication, perhaps constantly.  Again, 
much will depend on how the technology develops and is used.  The most that can 
be said at this point in time is that there are serious First Amendment privacy 
concerns lurking in the features of networked public places.  Whether any of them 
will ripen into constitutional violations will ultimately depend on their 
sophistication and uses.     
 
170 See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1973) (“The fantasies of a drug addict 
are his own and beyond the reach of government. . .”). 
171 Mitchell Gray, Urban Surveillance and Panopticism:  Will We Recognize the Facial 
Recognition Society?, 1 SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIETY 324 (2003), available at 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org. 
172 See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag  
salute for school children); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that state could not 
compel citizens to display state motto on license plates).   
173 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1308  
(2006) (holding that compelling campus recruiters to assist military employers with logistics of 
recruitment did not compel schools to speak). 
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F. Press:  “Citizen-Journalists” and Disclosures of Private Information 
 
The networking pf public places will also affect the reporting of news and 
the flow of information.  These things are of course critical to core First 
Amendment values like self-government and the search for truth.   
 
In the traditional model, news was gathered and disseminated by major 
news media outlets.  Reporters at news desks and on the beat delivered 
information to a mostly passive public audience.  Today, however, citizens have 
become increasingly involved in news-gathering and publishing.  The internet, of 
course, is the primary force behind this change.  Weblogs at first supplemented 
and now appear to be displacing the traditional press as sources of information.  
The networking of public places will continue this trend.  It will fill streets, parks, 
squares, and other public places with citizen-journalists.  Citizen-reporters will be 
able to easily deliver the “live and on the scene” portion of the news bloggers 
miss while at their desks.  They will be able to go out in the “field,” interview 
witnesses to events, and publish “reports” to an already growing number of Web 
clearinghouses.174 
This trend raises two important First Amendment issues.  The first issue 
involves the very definition of “the press.”  There is at this moment a serious 
debate regarding whether those who contribute and post to Weblogs and qualify 
as “press” under the First Amendment.  That question has some important 
pragmatic implications.  For example, if they are members of the press, bloggers 
would presumably be entitled to whatever privilege for withholding confidential 
sources the “mainstream” press possesses.175 In broader terms, although the press 
has few special privileges under the First Amendment its status presents special 
considerations with regard to such things as prior restraints and the application of 
general laws to press interests.176 If nothing else, the mantle of “the press” may 
cause courts to more carefully scrutinize limits on information gathering and 
publishing.    
 
174 Of course, for these clearinghouses to become legitimate news sources there will have to be 
some means of measuring and ensuring accuracy and reputation.   
175 The Supreme Court declined to explicitly recognize such a privilege in Branzburg. v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 655 (1972).  Many states have journalist shield laws.  One court has recently held that a 
state law extends to Weblogs.  See O’Grady v. Superior Court., 139 Cal. App.4th 1423, 1457-58 
(2006) (holding that California journalist’s privilege extends to weblog).  Courts could also create 
a journalist’s privilege under the common law.  See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F.3d 
1141, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 2006 (declining to create a common law journalist’s privilege in part 
owing to the difficulty of deciding whether bloggers and other citizen-journalists would be entitled 
to protection). 
176 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (invalidating injunction  
prohibiting publication of Pentagon Papers). 
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The Weblog now performs many of the same functions as major news 
media outlets in terms of informing the public, exposing governmental corruption, 
and providing public access to information on a broad array of issues of public 
concern.177 Whether by serving these functions bloggers are entitled to 
constitutional protection for sources or other press privileges is an interesting 
question.178 If they are, then one must ask whether “the press” continues to 
convey anything truly meaningful in constitutional terms.  After all, as one 
commentator has said:  “When everyone can be a member, the club can no longer 
promise special treatment.”179 
The networking of public places will contribute to the blurring of the line 
between members of the public and members of “the press.”  Sophisticated means 
of information gathering and publishing will be available to more and more 
citizens.  Like bloggers, on-the-ground citizen-journalists will likely claim First 
Amendment privileges and protections.  In United States v. Wolf,180 a freelance 
journalist has been jailed for refusing to turn over to a grand jury footage of a 
political protest in which anarchists are suspected of vandalizing a police car.  
Thus far the court has refused to recognize any journalist’s privilege for 
withholding the video footage.181 
Courts will increasingly be called upon in cases like this to determine not 
only the scope of constitutional privileges but the classes of persons entitled to 
claim them.  If “the press” is to retain any constitutional meaning at all, then not 
every citizen armed with a recording device and an internet connection can be 
considered a member of this club.  Among other things, the extent to which 
extending privileges and other protections to millions of citizen-journalists would 
undermine law enforcement interests surely counsels against expanding the 
definition so far.  And the ordinary citizen is not likely to be cultivating sources to 
facilitate the flow of sensitive information.  She is much more likely to be 
recording events as they occur on the ground.  She will be subject to no editorial 
oversight or professional standards.182 She will be primarily observing, with the 
 
177 See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia:  Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the 
Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (2003) 
(noting the merger of citizen and journalist functions). 
178 See, e.g., Laura Durity, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”:  The Need to Protect Newsgathering  
Despite the Distribution Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11, 37-38 (arguing in favor of 
functional definition of “journalist”).  
179 Berger, supra note – at 1378. 
180 United States v. Wolf, No. 06-900064 (N.D. Ca.).  
181 See Associated Press, Freelancer Jailed After Refusing to Hand Over Footage, August 2, 2006,  
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=17229.
182 See Anne Flanagan, Blogging:  A Journal Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 395, 415-17 (2006) (urging use of adoption of code of ethics as one 
standard for determining who qualifies as a “journalist”).  
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additional and often merely incidental capabilities of recording and publishing.  
She will, in short, remain more citizen than journalist.              
 
The second First Amendment issue relates to what all of these citizen-
journalists shall be permitted to report about.  Some of what transpires in public 
places consists of private facts and moments.  As discussed earlier, we expect at 
least some of the time to blend into public places.  If we cannot, this may affect 
public expressive activities.  The question here is whether there are any limits on 
fellow citizens’ efforts to report and publish private facts in public settings.   
 
The Supreme Court has been highly protective of the right to publish 
information, so long as it is lawfully obtained and of some interest to the public.  
In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,183 the Court held that a newspaper could not be punished 
under state law for truthfully publishing the name of a rape victim it had obtained 
lawfully.  Even this very personal fact was considered “newsworthy.”184 
The constitutional standard announced in Florida Star is in conflict with 
the privacy tort known as “publicity given to private life.”185 Indeed, as Justice 
White stated in his dissent in Florida Star, the decision effectively “obliterated” 
the tort.186 The standard of public significance or “newsworthiness” ultimately 
protects very little of our private lives from public disclosure.  That standard is 
designed to permit the broadest gathering and dissemination of information.  This 
is a salutary thing, of course, in terms of First Amendment values.  Indeed, some 
have suggested that the public disclosure privacy tort is wholly at odds with these 
basic values.187 If the tort is interpreted too broadly, it will likely chill speech and 
thus interfere with the flow of information to the public.   
 
When everyone becomes a gatherer and disseminator of news, however, 
then everything becomes to some degree a matter of public significance.  The 
networking of public places, which will be filled with citizen-journalists, will 
make us all increasingly “newsworthy” subjects.    If the tort of public disclosure 
of private facts was not already dead, the networking of public places will surely 
contribute to its passing.188 Citizen-journalists, like traditional reporters, will 
 
183 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
184 Id. at 533. 
185 Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 652D (1977). 
186 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).   
187 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight:  A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s 
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362 (1983) (arguing that tort threatened to chill speech 
and should be abandoned). 
188 For an argument that the tort was never terribly effective at protecting private information, see 
Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell:  Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied 
Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 903-04 (2006). 
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have few limits with regard to what is within their legitimate domain of reportage.  
This may further discourage, among other things, public expressive activity.189 
We may well wish to have some legal recourse in networked places 
crawling with camera-toting citizen-journalists.  We certainly must expect to be 
observed in public.  But that does not mean we expect that our every move will be 
recorded by citizen-journalists.190 The threat of tort liability might preserve at 
least some measure of private, anonymous life in public places.191 To this end, 
Professor Andrew McClurg has suggested that the privacy torts be expanded to 
include some right to “public privacy.”192 He argues that a tort action is needed 
for what he calls “public intrusions.” 193 As support for the recognition of this 
tort, he cites two factors, namely an increasingly aggressive media and advances 
in video and other technologies of surveillance and recording.194 
Although the matter is quite close, the First Amendment balance seems 
best struck in favor of recognizing such a tort.  There must of course be protection 
for citizen-journalists’ gathering and dissemination of matters of legitimate public 
interest.195 As noted earlier, protesters who videotape public events can 
effectively challenge “official” accounts of these events.  But when the matter 
recorded and published is one of wholly private interest – who one embraces, or 
meets with, or what books or magazines one reads, for example – then there 
should be some protection against intrusion even if the activity occurs in public.  
Taking the larger First Amendment view, such protection will help to ensure that 
there is continued presence in and use of public places.  There are already many 
factors that work against this presence and use, including pervasive official 
surveillance programs.  Citizen-journalists should not be permitted to contribute 
to these constraints by indiscriminately recording and publishing private moments 
in public places without consequence.                    
 
The First Amendment effects produced by the networking of public places 
will be both wide and deep.  Even the ongoing controversy over who constitutes 
“the press” will to some degree be affected.  Pervasive computing and always-
 
189 See supra notes – and accompanying text. 
190 See Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 652D (1977), Cmt. a, Highly offensive publicity (noting that 
citizen must tolerate “more or less casual observation”); id., illus. 10 (“A publishes, without B’s 
consent, a picture of B nursing her child.  This is an invasion of B’s privacy.”).  See also id., cmt. 
C, illus. 7 (publication of a young woman’s picture, taken at a public “Fun House,” showing her 
skirt over her head, constitutes invasion of privacy). 
191 See  
192 See Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort Theory of Liability 
for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1055 (1995) (proposing adoption of tort of 
public intrusion on privacy). 
193 See McClurg, supra note – at 1010-25. 
194 See id.
195 See id. at 1084 (discussing public interest factor). 
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available Web access will turn everyone into a potential citizen-journalist capable 
of filing reports “from the field.”  We ought to ensure that when all of this taping 
and recording captures private moments and events, there will be some recourse 
in tort law.  The First Amendment interests in continued use of public places 
outweigh the right of the citizen-journalists to “report” news that is of no 
legitimate public interest.     
 
IV.    Networked Public Places and Democratic Values 
 
It is important to consider the effect networked places may have on 
individual and collective First Amendment rights.  But there are much larger 
issues lurking in the steady progression toward networked public places.  As 
Professor Julie Cohen has recently reminded us, cyberspace and other 
technologies do not exist or operate in a spatial vacuum.  These things affect the 
lived, embodied spaces of real people.196 Professor Cohen is surely correct that 
“[c]yberspace is part of lived space[.]”197 As the foregoing discussion shows, this 
is now quite literally true.  Clouds, cameras, and computers are altering the public 
expressive environment.  They are affecting how we interact, who we interact 
with, and what information is at hand as we live and experience public places.    
 
We must ask, then, what sort of lived spaces networked places will 
ultimately be.198 We must examine the impact spatial networking may have on 
the ability of public places to serve critical First Amendment values relating to 
self-government.  To do this effectively we must consult the work of geographers 
and sociologists as well as constitutional scholars.  Networking will bring 
fundamental changes to urban and suburban landscapes.  It will affect how we 
live and experience public places.  Although it is too infrequently acknowledged, 
what these other disciplines have to say about public places is central to the 
constitutional considerations at hand.       
 
A.  Public Places and the Public Sphere 
 
An initial point of clarification is necessary.  In determining what effect 
networking will have on public expressive life, we must concretize matters by 
clarifying the relevant places under consideration.  “Public places” is obviously a 
large geographic canvas.  This Article has been concerned with public expressive 
places in the broadest sense, from sidewalks to malls to street corners.  These 
 
196 See Cohen, supra note – at --. 
197 Id.
198 See Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 119 (“As we percolate the physical environment, we 
intentionally or inadvertently redesign the public sphere.  In doing so, we will either catalyze or 
inhibit its primary functions.”), Blitz, supra note – at 683 (noting that surveillance of urban spaces 
may transform cities into small towns). 
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places make up what I have elsewhere referred to as an “expressive topography” -
- the public space potentially available for expressive activities.199 These places 
are all to one degree or another becoming networked places.   
 
My use of “public place” is narrower than the concept of the “public 
sphere.”200 As noted earlier, Professors Kang and Cuff have analyzed the effect 
of one particular aspect of the networked environment -- pervasive computing -- 
on the public sphere.  As they conceive it, this sphere “connotes the 
comprehensive intermingling of spatial and social terrains.”201 The public sphere, 
they say, is an open space of interaction and exchange, a shared space separate 
from the “intimate, protected, and familiar” private sphere.202 This sphere is 
much broader than “public places.”  Indeed Kang and Cuff note that the public 
sphere extends to such places as movie theatres, laundromats, even traffic jams.203 
To analyze the effects of pervasive computing on the public sphere, 
Professors Kang and Cuff chose as their paradigmatic spatial example the 
shopping mall, a place that illustratively and effectively combines elements of 
community and commerce.204 They appear to have chosen the mall for two 
general reasons.  First, they note that “in many urban environments, malls are 
arguably what our public spaces have become.”205 This is unfortunately true, 
insofar as public places now facilitate commerce more than any other form of 
interaction.  Second, the mall was chosen as a paradigm because it is a place 
where people can generally be found.  As Kang and Cuff say, they wish to be 
“practical,” to “look at the spaces where people actually are, not where academics 
long for them to be.”206 
The focus on the public sphere generally, and the mall in particular, is too 
broad and too narrow respectively.  It is too broad if one is asking, as this Article 
does, what effect spatial networking will have on expressive values.  Many of the 
places in the public sphere, including laundromats and traffic jams, have no 
connection at all to such values.  In fact, malls as a class of property are not 
presently considered expressive forums.207 The shopping mall in particular is an 
 
199 See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note --. 
200 See RICHARD SENNETT, FALL OF PUBLIC MAN (1976) (discussing concept of the public sphere). 
201 Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 116. 
202 Id.
203 See id. at 116-18 (discussing the “public sphere”). 
204 See id. at 119 (adopting the shopping mall as the relevant application).     
205 Id. 
206 Id. See, e.g., Jennifer Niles Coffin, The United Mall of America:  Free Speech, State 
Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 615, 617-
18 (2000) (noting the multiple functions of the modern shopping mall). 
207 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding that protestors of the Vietnam War 
had no right to distribute handbills in shopping center); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) 
(holding that labor picketers had no right to demonstrate at shopping center). 
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example of what I have elsewhere called, borrowing a term from geographers, an 
expressive “non-place” -- a space where expressive culture is discouraged or 
prevented from developing.208 To be sure, as Kang and Cuff note, urban social 
critics have long lamented the “malling” of public place.209 But to an extent this 
begs the question:  What functions ought our public places to serve?  As well, 
whether or not academics wish it so, people in fact do remain on the streets, in the 
parks, and in public squares.  They continue to rely on these places, and others, to 
exercise public expressive liberties.  We ought to ask how we might make space 
for expressive activity in such places.   
 
The paradigm we should adopt in order to address specifically expressive 
values is not a mall, but something more akin to the (National) Mall.210 For 
purposes of the discussion that follows, let us take as our paradigm place not the 
shopping mall but the local public park or public square.  These are the sorts of 
places that are most critical in terms of engendering civic republicanism and a 
sense of democratic community.211 
What speech activity will occur or be possible in these places once they 
become networked?  Who will actively participate, and by what means?  How 
democratic and facilitative of self-government will networked public places 
actually be?  What steps might be taken to ensure that public expressive values 
will endure in the public places of the future?  To answer these questions we must 
first have a better sense of the expressive functions public places ideally might 
serve.212 
208 See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note – at 480 (discussing mall spaces as part of the 
expressive topography).  As Kang and Cuff note, in the mall “[p]eople-watching, not self-
governance, may be what is on the agenda.”  Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 117. 
209 See, e.g., MICHAEL SORKIN ed., VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND 
THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE (1992). 
210 Kang and Cuff would no doubt object that theirs is the more practical paradigm, since they 
“look at the spaces where people actually are, not where academics long for them to be.”  Kang & 
Cuff, supra note – at 120.  But people definitely remain on the streets, in the parks, and in public 
squares.  They go to these places, and others, to exercise public expressive liberties.  That they 
may do so less often than they go to a shopping mall is beside the point.  It may beg the question 
whether public spaces that were more conducive to expression would be less sparsely populated. 
211 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 335-36 (1996) (commenting on the 
connection between New Urbanism projects focusing on the centrality of public places, 
community, and civic republicanism). 
212 I do not contend that public places currently serve these functions, or at least that they do so 
effectively in most cases.  I wish to inquire whether the networking of public places might further 
undermine these ideal functions, and if so how.   
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES 
47
B.   The Democratic Functions of Public Places 
 
Public places substantially influence the nature and character of public 
citizenship.213 Their architectures (material and otherwise), the degree of freedom 
of access to them, and the nature of public interaction within them, mark the 
boundaries of our public liberties.  To the extent that our public places are open 
and vibrant, they have the capacity to facilitate citizens’ claims to identity, create 
breathing space for democratic participation and self-governance, and lend 
transparency to public expression and democratic governance.  To the extent that 
use of such places is discouraged by spatial networking, these critical democratic 
functions are diminished.  To be quite clear, what follows is very much a 
description of an ideal state of affairs.  I do not contend that parks, squares, and 
other expressive places currently serve the highlighted functions, or at least that 
they serve them very well.  But we should not build a networked environment that 
undermines these functions.             
 
1. Place and Identity  
 
Democratic citizenship involves living among others in a polity.  
Regardless of how often we may retreat to private enclaves, citizenship still 
requires some degree of public presence.  As geographers have noted, the 
presence of an individual or group in public places is itself a claim to 
acceptance.214 It is important that all have an equal opportunity to actively 
participate in public expressive activities in public places.   
 
Material public places, as noted in Part II, serve a leveling or equalizing 
function in this regard.  The causes of “little people” find voice there.  The recent 
nationwide immigrant protests made a quintessential identity claim in this 
fashion.215 By assembling in the streets and expressing themselves there, 
immigrants expressed a clear message:  “We are here, and we are not going 
anywhere.”  Their demonstrations and other activities sparked a national 
conversation about the nation’s immigration policies.216 The situation bears some 
resemblance to the identity claims civil rights protesters made in the 1960s when 
they took to the streets, occupied public buildings, and staged sit-ins.  They too 
 
213 See Blitz, supra note – at 710-11 (discussing importance of urban places like parks and streets  
to First Amendment rights and public experience). 
214 See generally DON MITCHELL, A RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR  
PUBLIC SPACE  (2004) (noting how presence in place constitutes a claim to acceptance as part of 
community).  See also N. Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere:  A Contribution to Actually 
Existing Democracy, 25/26 SOCIAL TEXT 56-79 (1990).    
215 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After Immigration Protests, Goal is Still Elusive, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, May 3, 2006, A1 (describing protests and recent social activism of immigrants).  
216 See id.
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were arguing for inclusion in a democratic community.  Their very presence 
symbolized their right to exist, to be counted as members of the polity.        
 
If access to public places indicates acceptance, exclusion or substantial 
displacement conveys denial of one’s public identity.  This is sometimes a matter 
of social justice, as when the poor and homeless are ejected from substantial 
urban areas or harassed through aggressive enforcement of vagrancy laws.217 
Class biases unfortunately persist in today’s public square.  Officials can be over-
zealous in their efforts to preserve public norms of order and tranquility.  For 
example, a federal appeals court recently invalidated a Los Angeles law 
permitting the arrest and conviction of the homeless for merely being – standing, 
sitting, or sleeping – in certain public places.218 The court held, in essence, that 
authorities cannot simply ban the public existence of an entire class of people.   
 
Public places are symbolic of equality, acceptance, and political 
community.  They are open to all on an equal basis, regardless of social or 
economic class.  To exclude someone, either directly or indirectly, from 
participation in public life is a derogation of a fundamental claim to public 
identity.  Many forces negatively affect public claims of civic identity.  Among 
these are the increasing trend toward privatization of public places, gender- and 
race-based public harassment, and a variety of legal regulations of the places 
where expression may occur.219 We must ask what further impact the networking 
of public places might have on public presence, participation, and identity claims. 
 
217 For a thorough examination of the social justice implications of access to public places, 
particularly claims of the homeless, see generally MITCHELL, supra note -- .
218 See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (invalidating ordinance on 
Eighth Amendment grounds). 
219 See generally Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note –; Zick, Space, Place, and Speech,
supra note – .     
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2. Place and Self-Governance 
 
In addition to facilitating identity claims, public places serve fundamental 
self-governance functions.220 They provide critical breathing room in which 
speakers can approach, speak to, and attempt to persuade audiences.221 In the 
material marketplace conversations with other public citizens take place, petitions 
are signed, leaflets and pamphlets are distributed, signs are carried and posted, 
parades and protests are staged.  The people practice self-governance in public 
places.   
 
Consider a place like the National Mall.  The Mall is a deeply inscribed 
public place; one might say sacred ground insofar as self-governance is 
concerned.  The condition of this place matters deeply in terms of shared national 
First Amendment values.  Traditionally, speakers and audiences gathered in this 
and other public places with some confidence that authorities were not tracking 
their every movement and utterance.  This created open space for protest and 
dissent.  But in a broader sense it created stages for democratic participation of all 
sorts.  Public places have traditionally been part of a democratic commons, not 
militarized grids under constant surveillance by public and private devices.     
 
It is not merely the character of these places but the manner in which 
people are able to interact there that determines the scope of self-governance.  
Self-governance requires, fundamentally, that listeners hear and audiences see 
speakers as they attempt to convey messages.  One of the principal advantages of 
physically emplaced expression, as opposed to the many burgeoning forms of 
virtual communication, is its ability to jar an audience, to force it to heed the 
messenger (if not the message).  Jehovah’s Witnesses, labor activists, anti-war 
protesters, suffragists, feminists, and civil rights proponents have all relied on the 
 
220 See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989) (discussing 
“marketplace” and other free speech justifications); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND 
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15-16, 24-27 (1948) (elaborating a self-governance theory 
of expression). 
221 To be sure, some have long doubted the salience of outdoor expressive activities like protest,  
solicitation, and pamphleteering. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 
793-94 (1987) (arguing that the lack of locality and economic realities undermine the effectiveness 
of traditional public expression).  A massive societal centralization has undermined the formation 
of community and the local conditions under which public expression might thrive.  See generally 
SANDEL, supra note --.  Legal limits often undermine public expression.  And today 
communicative outlets continue to proliferate on the Web and elsewhere.  Although each of these 
things no doubt affects the incidence and effectiveness of public expression, people continue to 
seek public expressive space for their causes.  Even in the virtual era, or perhaps especially so, 
people seek the physical and tangible.   
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tangibility and physicality of public places and public expression to further their 
causes.  They have understood, as many still do, that effective speech sometimes 
entails interfering with the settled expectations of the unwilling or undecided 
public audience.  Public places cannot serve fundamental participatory functions 
unless these conditions can regularly be met.  
 
In addition, then, to facilitating identity claims public places are pragmatic 
proving grounds for public speakers and audiences.  They are, or at least have 
been, spaces for public interaction.  Whether or not speakers have persuaded 
listeners, public places have provided them the opportunity to do so.  Public self-
governance depends upon the continued existence of such opportunities.   
 
3.  Place and Transparency  
 
As noted in Part II, one of the defining characteristics of expression in 
material public places is its visibility and transparency.  Public places serve two 
critical transparency functions.  These assist speakers in making identity claims 
and facilitate public participation and self-governance.        
 
First, because it takes place in the open material public expression can be 
seen and heard by others occupying the same places.  Unlike, say, lobbying and 
other forms of private attempts at political persuasion, public expression is part of 
a public record.  The public audience can witness the speech of marginal groups.  
It can come to know and recognize a cause.  The public can assess the look and 
feel of speakers.  How disgruntled or angry is this group?  Does it represent a 
potential threat to safety?  Do I want to support its cause?  For the speaker, public 
displays can attract media attention and public sympathy, expand participation in 
a movement or cause, and signal support for that cause to public officials.222 The 
transparency, or visibility, of public expression can create positive cascades in 
terms of public support, publicity, or policy change.223 
Second, official regulation of public expression has tended itself to be 
visible and transparent.  As the recent controversy regarding the National Security 
Agency’s wiretapping program demonstrates,224 the degree of regulatory 
transparency affects public perceptions of the very legitimacy of government.  
Traditionally, in material public places we have been able to see the tactics police 
are using to restrict public speakers and public assemblies.  The public becomes a 
witness to these things.  It is thus in a position to determine for itself whether 
 
222 See, e.g., Susanne Lohmann, A Signaling Model of Competitive Political Pressures, 7 ECON. &
POL. 181 (1995) (analyzing policy impact of public protests on congressional voting).   
223 It can, of course, also create negative cascades, as when protests are violent or destructive.   
224 See John Markoff, Questions Raised for Phone Giants in Spy Data Furor, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, May 13, 2006, A1 (reporting fallout from domestic surveillance program). 
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official tactics respect basic civil liberties.  Public places are among the very few 
in which   transparency of this sort exists. 
 
A vast amount of expression has recently migrated online.  As it continues 
to go there, concerns continue to arise with regard to the transparency of 
governmental efforts to monitor expression in cyber-places.  This is so because 
neither the speech on the Web nor its regulation is particularly transparent.  The 
speech there is read, not witnessed and experienced by the public and the media.  
It is thus more critical than ever that we preserve at least some public space for 
expression that is both transparently experienced and regulated.                 
 
C.  The Networked Public Citizen 
 
The networking of public places will do more than raise some interesting 
First Amendment issues.  It will alter the experiences of place and public 
expression.  It will impact the First Amendment values that might ideally be 
served by public places.  This section examines the effects networking will have 
on public expression and civic life more generally in public places.  The final 
section offers some modest proposals that may help preserve the critical functions 
of public places.    
 
1.   Populated Places and the Public Digital Divide              
 
Of course, public places cannot serve any particular function unless they 
are sufficiently populated.  Until recently substantial barriers have existed to 
maintaining network connectivity in public places.  “Online” has been a condition 
relating primarily to the private sphere.  
 
Municipal wireless projects will turn entire cities and regions into 
“hotspots.”  Access to information and communications technologies will burgeon 
even in currently underserved rural areas, further reducing the digital divide.  In 
vast urban and suburban areas, citizens will no longer be limited to private areas 
when they wish to access the internet.  Concepts like “online” and “offline” will 
thus continue to lose relevance, at least for many citizens, as public places 
become networked.  For those with access to the latest technologies, information 
will flow more freely everywhere. 
 
This networking may have the salutary effect of increasing Americans’ 
use of public places.  It will also likely increase their use of mobile technologies 
in those places.225 As some have noted, American citizens have been less likely 
 
225 The public library experience is again somewhat analogous.  The obvious concern of public 
libraries as we entered an information age was how to remain vibrant, or even relevant, places for 
the consumption of information now delivered over networks rather than on shelves.  By 
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than citizens in other countries to utilize mobile communications technologies in 
public places.226 One suspected reason for this cultural divide is that in this 
country we have vast areas of private space – in our homes, our workplaces, and 
elsewhere – in which to engage in expression and interaction.  It may also be the 
case that until now, our public network connections have been too weak to 
support robust use of the latest technologies in public areas.  As clouds appear and 
networks are strengthened, we may expect to see many people personally 
computing and communicating in public places.        
 
Those who study urban and suburban geographies might initially be 
encouraged by this prospect.  Indeed, the basic agenda of “new urbanist” scholars 
and activists is to revive common spaces like parks and squares as centers of 
interaction and community-building.227 These theorists generally believe that by 
widening suburban sidewalks, planning communities around central public places, 
and cutting back single-use zoning civic interaction can be greatly facilitated.228 
Widely available wireless connectivity may provide citizens with a reason to 
remain in public places.   
 
Of course, mere public presence is not the primary goal.  New urbanists 
and other public place activists envision public places that are areas of encounter 
among citizens from different backgrounds, races, and ethnicities.229 Public 
expression is most vibrant when a variety of claimants engage in a variety of 
speech forms.  But this raises the question:  Who will the networked public citizen 
be?  And whose identity claims will be most fully on display in newly networked 
parks and squares?     
 
The networking of public places may have the unintended negative effect 
of creating new classes of haves and have-nots.  A public digital divide may 
develop between technologically literate groups and the still publicly 
disconnected.230 The networked environment will become more and more 
facilitative of digital communication.  Indeed, it may render access to digital 
technologies critical to public participation.  But at the same time public places 
 
providing internet access, public libraries not only helped to close a digital divide.  They also 
ensured that the library would remain a critical community space. 
226 RHEINGOLD, supra note – at 157-58.  
227 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 
(1999).  
228 Id.
229 Much of this agenda dates back to the 1960s, when activists like Jane Jacobs stressed the 
importance of architectures to urban communities.  See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF 
GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).  
230 On the status of the digital divide in the United States, see United States Department of  
Commerce, Falling Through the Net:  Toward Digital Inclusion (2000), available at   
http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf.
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may become more foreign and alienating locales for those not wired for their best 
uses.   
 
Wireless clouds and pervasive personal computing may even alter the 
socially acceptable uses of public places.  Publicly online citizens may seek to 
enforce a norm of quiet computing that suppresses noisier forms of expression 
available to still-offline citizens.  If they cannot enforce that norm, there is a 
danger that public Netizens may retreat back into their homes and other private 
spaces.   
 
The transition to networked public places may affect the democratic 
functioning of places in ways that are not immediately apparent.  Always-on 
connectivity may bring people into the public square.  But not everyone will be 
able to participate equally.  New digital divisions and contests over appropriate 
behavioral norms in networked places may arise.  The still-offline citizen may 
become further alienated, disengaged, and displaced in public, while the 
networked citizen’s claims and displays may be increasingly privileged.      
 
2.   The People -- Disconnected  
 
Even if the people are drawn into public places, we must ask what sort of 
expressive activity will take place there.  What sorts of claims, displays, and 
communication will occur?  To serve identity, self-governance, and transparency 
functions networked places must facilitate not only commercial and recreational 
interaction but more substantive public communication as well.  But will they?   
 
As noted in Part II, the networking of public places will provide greater 
opportunities for social networking.231 These networks will become more and 
more sophisticated.  This should facilitate spontaneous assemblies in public 
places.  Networked public assemblies, protests, and demonstrations should be 
smarter than ever before, at least for those with access to up-to-date technologies.                           
 
Even if this transpires, however, protests and demonstrations constitute 
only a small fraction of the public expressive culture.  Ideally, public places ought 
to facilitate spontaneous interactions and speech claims of all sorts, everything 
from solicitation to petitioning to begging.232 Networked public places are not 
 
231 See supra notes – and accompanying text. 
232 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Dangers of Fighting Terrorism With Technocommunitarianism:  
Constitutional Protections of Free Expression, Exploration, and Unmonitored Activity in Urban 
Spaces, 32 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 677, 686 (2005) (noting importance of urban spaces in particular 
to “opportunities for giving speeches to large crowds, for confronting strangers with ideas they 
may find unfamiliar or provocative, or for speaking or gathering information in the anonymity of 
the crowd”).  
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likely to do so, however.  What we are more likely to see in networked public 
places is an increasingly disconnected populace.233 
Among the connected, Web access carried over public networks on 
pervasive mobile devices will increase the phenomenon known as “absent 
presence.”234 As sociologists and urban geographers have noted, people are 
becoming increasingly disconnected from events in material places.235 This 
distance has serious First Amendment implications in terms of the identity, self-
governance, and transparency functions of public places. 
 
Networked public citizens, their eyes cast downward and ears filled with 
audio devices, may not see or hear messages other than those transmitted into 
their personal bubbles.236 They will not see, hear, or experience a range of 
identity claims.  They will be more inclined – and more able -- to simply ignore 
solicitors, proselytizers, beggars, and other marginalized speakers.  In addition, 
self-governance requires exposure to speakers and messages one does not agree 
with and may even be initially unwilling to engage.237 But the networking of 
public places will decrease chance encounters with unwanted messages.238 
Speech in networked public places will also be less and less transparent.  
Wireless clouds and pervasive personal computing in public will affect the very 
aesthetics -- the look, feel, and experience -- of public expressive activity.  
Formerly private communication forms like email and text messaging will 
proliferate, while tangible and face-to-face communication continues to fade from 
public venues.  Networking features and practices will alter even the expressive 
“noise” of public places.239 Public parks and squares will resemble offices and 
other private spaces of work and recreation.   
 
233 See Kevin Robins, Foreclosing on the City?  The Bad Idea of Virtual Urbanism, in  
TECHNOCITIES: THE CULTURE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 34-59 
(John Downey & Jim McGuigan eds., 1999) (criticizing idea that one can restore a sense of 
community by building virtual communication networks). 
234 See Cohen, supra note – at – (discussing absent presence, or what is sometimes referred to as 
“present absence”).  See also Kenneth J. Gergen, The Challenge of Absent Presence, in JAMES E.
KATZ & MARK A. AAKHUS, EDS., PERPETUAL CONTACT: MOBILE COMMUNICATION, PRIVATE TALK,
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 227 (2002). 
235 See generally JAMES E. KATZ, MAGIC IN THE AIR: MOBILE COMMUNICATION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL LIFE (2006) (examining effects of mobile and pervasive 
communications technology on daily interaction). 
236 Cass Sunstein has referred to the private filtering or narrowcasting of information as the “Daily 
Me,” a technological bubble that channels pre-selected content to the listener or viewer.  See CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 7 (2001). 
237 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003). 
238 See FLUSTY, supra note --, at 12 (noting importance of chance encounters to civic life). 
239 See MICHAEL BULL, SOUND MOVES: IPOD CULTURE AND URBAN EXPERIENCE 
(2006)(examining how the iPod and other portable devices are changing the audio experience of 
public places). 
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The new urbanist philosophy suggests that if you build wider streets and 
more inviting spaces then people will come.  People may indeed populate more 
user-friendly places.  But the quality of public presence and interaction, 
particularly as it concerns the exercise of public expressive liberties, is another 
matter.  If we turn our public places into home offices and shield ourselves in 
mobile technology bubbles, people will become increasingly disconnected in 
public.  The phenomenon of “absent presence” will negatively affect the identity, 
participation, and transparency functions of public places.     
 
3.   The Purification of Public Places 
 
Chance encounters and expressive noise will not be the only things 
missing in networked public places.  Other forms of spatial purification will also 
occur.  As noted, urban social critics contend that the modern built environment 
places a premium on recreation and mass consumption rather than social 
interaction.240 The networking of public places will exacerbate this problem in 
ways we are only now beginning to appreciate.  Again, public places serve their 
functions best when a multitude of expressive forms – symbols, acts, and theatre – 
are present.   
 
Urban geographers have offered a very strong case to the effect that public 
surveillance, in particular, will cause a purification of public places.  Open and 
dynamic places will be “replaced by pseudo-public spaces like those in shopping 
malls, where commercial imperatives dominate and what goes on, and who 
participates, is intensely regulated and tightly controlled so that profitable 
consumption is maximized.”241 As these places facilitate more and more 
consumption, they will leave less and less space for ordinary expressive activities.   
 
Protest and dissent in particular may be deemed almost entirely out of 
place, even in once quintessential public places, under the gaze of constant 
surveillance.  Professors Kang and Cuff show rather convincingly how embedded 
computing in malls -- their chosen spatial paradigm -- can “control access, 
facilitate policing, [and] minimize loitering[.]”242 These effects are not, of course, 
limited to the spaces of malls.  The combination of surveillance, digital 
awareness, and constant identification may just as readily be used to control 
access to and facilitate policing of parks, squares and other public places.   
 
240 See generally VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF 
PUBLIC SPACE (Michael Sorkin ed., 1992); STEVEN FLUSTY, BUILDING PARANOIA: THE 
PROLIFERATION OF INTERDICTORY SPACE AND THE EROSION OF SPATIAL JUSTICE (1994).   
241 Michael McCahill, Beyond Foucault:  Towards a Contemporary Theory of Surveillance, in 
CLIVE NORRIS, JADE MORAN AND GARY ARMSTRONG (eds.), SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT 
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 52 (1998). 
242 Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 121. 
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If applied across the full range of the expressive topography -- from malls 
to parks to squares -- network controls may substantially affect the identity, self-
governance, and transparency functions of public places.  For instance, Kang and 
Cuff note that in a mall, technology could provide “an additional, more 
sophisticated and granular layer of access control.”243 Individuals might be 
discouraged from entering the space of the mall by means of a “blacklist” 
generated by a combination of computer algorithms and embedded tags and 
devices.244 If patron identification difficulties could be resolved, perhaps by some 
sort of frequent-shopper tag or card, they note the possibility of exclusion of 
“those with any brush with law enforcement, mental illness, or civil disturbance 
could be seen as socially reasonable.”245 
Public places like squares and parks might be similarly purified of 
potential threats to public order and safety.  Using the full network power of video 
surveillance, future biometric technologies, wireless internet data, and mobile 
GPS devices, it may be possible to identify in advance and exclude certain 
persons from demonstrations, campaign events, or other public gatherings.  The 
policing of place, which would be mostly covert, might even be used to detain or 
discourage certain speakers.  This is not the stuff of sci-fi fantasy.  At least one 
company claims to have developed “a fully automated facial recognition system 
based on neural network software . . . which can scan the faces of the crowd in 
‘real’ time and compare the faces with images of known ‘troublemakers’ held on 
a digital database.”246 In an era when preemptive governmental intervention and 
“watch lists” are increasingly becoming the norm, it is not hard to imagine 
officials seeking to prevent potentially disruptive protesters from occupying 
certain public places in advance.             
 
The networking of public places may have even broader effects on the 
identity and participation functions, however.  Social science evidence suggests 
that women, the homeless, and people of color experience being in material 
public places differently than do other citizens.247 Scholars have noted that public 
surveillance “raises major questions about geographic change, social control, 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion . . . and the spatial dynamics of the so-called 
 
243 Id. at 122. 
244 Id.
245 Id. at 124. 
246 CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: THE RISE OF 
CCTV 217 (Oxford 1999). 
247 See NIELSEN, supra note – at 6 (noting that “simply being in public is different for white 
women, people of color, and those in poverty”). 
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information society.”248 Some studies also indicate that officials use surveillance 
technologies to purify public places of groups like the homeless and teenagers.  
Others have shown that surveillance has targeted women for voyeuristic reasons 
and has been used to profile racial minorities.249 Other groups, including 
homosexuals, may also experience networked public places differently.250 Today, 
of course, it is not difficult to imagine Muslim citizens living a chilled public life 
in places where every word and gesture is potentially subject to official and 
unofficial surveillance techniques.251 
Surveillance is not the only network feature that may chill certain forms of 
expression and association.  Professors Kang and Cuff ask:   
 
How likely are you to walk through the gay and lesbian studies 
section of Borders if you are closeted and know that RFID readers 
are locked on your body?  How likely will you be to grouse about 
the administration if you are an Arab American male, walking with 
fellow Arab American friends, after the Department of Homeland 
Security has just warned about terrorist plots in the malls?252 
Eventually, embedded technologies like digital tags will raise these sorts of 
concerns in all public places.  A constantly authenticating spatial environment 
may drive certain forms of identity and participation underground -- or at least 
away from certain networked public places.253 While some may thus be 
 
248 Stephen Graham, Spaces of Surveillant Simulation:  New Technologies, Digital 
Representations, and Material Geographies, in 6 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING D: SOCIETY AND 
SPACE 483-504 (1998).   
249 See H. Koskela, Video Surveillance, Gender and the Safety of Public Urban Space:  “Peeping 
Tom” Goes High Tech?, 23 URBAN GEOGRAPHY 257-78 (2002) (explaining gender effects of 
public surveillance); Katherine S. Williams and Craig Johnstone, The Politics of the Selective 
Gaze:  Closed Circuit Television and the Policing of Public Space, 34.2 CRIME, LAW & SOCIAL 
CHANGE 183-210 (2000) (exploring how cameras are used to exclude certain groups).   
250 See Jeffrey Rosen, A Cautionary Tale for a New Age of Surveillance, 14 SCHIZOPHONIA 
(August 2003), available at http://www.schizophonia.com/archives/cctv.htm (noting that 
homosexuals may be inhibited by presence of public surveillance cameras). 
251 See Andrea Elliott, After 9/11, Arab Americans Fear Police Acts, Study Finds, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, June 12, 2006, A15.  See also Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Dangers of Fighting Terrorism 
With Technocommunitarianism:  Constitutional Protections of Free Expression, Exploration, and 
Unmonitored Activity in Urban Spaces, 32 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 677 (2005) (examining 
implications of monitoring urban spaces in order to protect against terrorist threats).   
252 See Kang & Cuff, supra note -- at 127.  See also Cohen, supra note – at – (noting that “the shift 
to networked space changes the character of existing space even for those who are unaware of its 
presence”).   
253 See Clive Norris, From Personal to Digital:  CCTV, the Panopticon, and the Technological 
Mediation of Suspicion and Social Control, in DAVID LYON, ed., SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL 
SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 278 (2002) (noting that “it is the 
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encouraged to populate networked places by features like wireless access, others 
may be deterred from doing so by other features of the networked environment.     
 
The upshot is that in presently very difficult to quantify ways, the 
networking of public places may have a leveling and sterilizing effect on public 
expressive life.  Certain individual and group speech activities may be less and 
less visible in networked places.  Certain forms of speech may begin to disappear 
as the phenomenon of “anticipatory conformity” cleanses public places of all but 
the most acceptable displays.254 Dissent and disruption, which are already subject 
to a growing number of material spatial regulations, will be even less likely to 
appear in networked public places.255 Privacy experts have noted that 
surveillance and data retention tend to substantially dampen spontaneous 
behavior.256 These things internalize control and produce a degree of self-
vigilance.257 Whether or not any of these effects is sufficient to constitute the 
prohibited “chilling” of expression, they will most certainly affect the expressive 
functioning of public places.     
 
Many of the features of networked public places will operate in a non-
transparent, even covert, fashion.  They will have the effects noted above in part 
because people will not know to what extent they are being watched, by whom, or 
for what purpose.258 The automated nature of some new surveillance methods, 
the anonymity of methods of control and regulation, and a general uncertainty 
about the scope and use of the public record may breed further mistrust of 
 
254 See supra notes – and accompanying text.  See also Philip Tabor, I Am a Videocam, in IAN 
BORDER, JANE KERR, JOE RENDELL AND ALICIA PIVARO (EDS.), THE UNKNOWN CITY:
CONTESTING ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIAL SPACE 135 (2001) (“The very idea of surveillance 
evokes curiosity, desire, aggression, guilt, and, above all, fear – emotions that interact in daydream 
dramas of seeing and being seen, concealment and self-exposure, attack and defence, seduction 
and enticement.”). 
255 For a discussion of spatial controls, see generally Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 
--  
256 See Slobogin, supra note – at 243-44.  See also Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy:  Some 
Arguments and Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 325-26 (Ferdinand 
David Schoeman, ed., 1984); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 
1154 (2002) (noting effect on behavior of anonymous surveillance and data collection). 
257 Hille Koskela, The Gaze Without Eyes:  Video Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban 
Space, 24 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 253 (2000). 
258 Urban geographers and criminologists have compared the effect of network surveillance to the 
concept of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a structure that leverages the power of spatiality and 
surveillance to keep prisoners guessing as to whether, when, and how their actions were being 
monitored.  See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE 108 
(2001).  See also See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
(1975) (discussing the Panopticon).  
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government, resentment of public officials, and consequent avoidance of public 
places.259 
The networking of public places will further diminish what one 
geographer has called “the democratic admixture of the pavements.”260 It may 
ultimately contribute to what another scholar calls “the current urban malaise.”261 
In the purified public square identity claims and unconventional modes of 
participation will be segregated and managed by non-transparent networking 
features like surveillance and automated identification.262 Public places will be 
far less attractive venues for self-governance and other public democratic 
functions.            
 
D.  Retaining the Civic Character of Public Places – Some 
Modest Proposals 
 
The networking of public places may challenge the democratic and 
expressive functioning of places by creating a new public digital divide, 
distracting public speakers and audiences, and further sanitizing public venues.  It 
is important to recognize these potential effects in advance of the full networking 
of public places.  There is no preventing this networking.  It will happen.  Indeed 
it is already happening.  But there are some steps that might be taken to counteract 
at least some of these changes, thus preserving or at least making possible more 
robust civic and expressive public places.  This section briefly discusses a few 
modest proposals that relate to preserving the basic First Amendment functions of 
public places.   
 
1.  Ownership and Access  
 
As access to communications technologies becomes increasingly critical 
to the identity and participation functions of networked public places, differential 
access to these technologies necessarily becomes a greater concern.  The focus in 
studies of the digital divide has thus far been on access provided in private places 
like the home or public settings like schools.263 Given the strong trend toward 
 
259 See G.T. Marx, What’s New About the “New Surveillance”?:  Classifying for Change and 
Continuity, 1 SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIETY 28 (2002) (noting automation of new surveillance 
technologies) (available at http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1/whatsnew.pdf). 
260 MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 231 (1990). 
261 Jon Bannister, Nicholas Fyfe, & Ade Kearns, Closed Circuit Television and the City, in CLIVE 
NORRIS, J. MORAN & G. ARMSTRONG (eds.), SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL 22 (1998).   
262 See Don Mitchell, The End of Public Space?  People’s Park, Definitions of the Public, and 
Democracy, ,85 ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 115 (1995) (noting 
that surveillance creates “planned, controlled, ordered space”).  
263 See, e.g., Dept. of Commerce study, supra note – (measuring access to the Internet in homes  
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public place networking, we must now also begin to address a nascent divide that 
will affect public expressive space on a large scale.  
 
In the not-so-distant future, access to the latest technologies of 
communication will be required for effective communication – with government 
in some cases and with fellow citizens in others -- in public places.  Thus the 
manner in which municipalities provide public Web access will be critically 
important to public expression.  To maintain the leveling quality of public places, 
it will be increasingly important that as many citizens as possible have access to 
the latest technologies.   
 
It is important that municipalities that provide wireless public access own 
their networks.  Like roads, wireless networks will require continuous upgrades.  
Individual companies or groups of service providers may not be willing to 
undertake the necessary repairs.  In addition, by owning the networks officials can 
ensure that the public has open access to them.  Like the streets themselves, 
wireless clouds should not be subject to a myriad of private access restrictions.  If 
cities are committed to providing this new means of communication, they should 
be willing to invest substantially in the expressive infrastructure of the future.     
 
In addition, the provision of “tiered” public access is particularly 
troublesome.  The desire to subsidize public costs is understandable.  Public 
internet access ought, however, to be freely available to members of the public.  
There should not be classes of wireless connectivity, with the highest speeds and 
applications available only to those with the means to pay.  This would be like 
restricting some citizens to a virtual sidewalk while others speed past on a moving 
sidewalk.  There are, of course, circumstances in which citizens are required to 
pay for access to the means of communication.  For example, permitting schemes 
for demonstrations and parades sometimes require pre-insurance or the posting of 
a bond.264 But these requirements generally relate to possible damage that might 
result from the expressive activity.  The public Web platform – the clouds and 
meshes above public areas -- is not characterized by scarcity or any other cost 
resulting from specific or additional users.  Thus there ought to be no permit fee 
for public wireless use.        
 
Access concerns extend beyond wireless portals.  In the fully networked 
environment a mere internet connection will not suffice to facilitate effective 
expression.  Public citizens will need the appropriate mobile technologies as well.  
These mobile devices will link people to the public network.  Hand-held, worn, 
 
and schools).    
264 See C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness:  Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, 
and Manner Regulations, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 992 (1983) (analyzing parade permit 
requirements). 
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and portable communications technologies will become basic requisites for 
communicating with institutions and governments.  Public safety announcements, 
for example, may be delivered over public networks.  Devices will also be needed 
for social networking and collective public action.  A “datasense” will be required 
for full participation in public life.  Governments of course have no constitutional 
obligation to subsidize access to the latest communications technologies.  But if 
they are going to facilitate public connectivity then they should also consider 
supporting access as well to the communicative technologies needed to 
communicate in a networked environment. 265 
2.  Regulatory Transparency  
 
As noted, surveillance may substantially affect use of networked public 
places.  Citizens’ knowledge of official access and other controls in public places 
may turn out to be critical to the functioning of public places and public 
expression.   
 
Governments should start now to develop protocols and regulations that 
limit public surveillance activity and the collection and retention of citizen data.266 
Adoption of surveillance programs should be the result of an open and transparent 
public process.  Among other things, communities should seriously and publicly 
debate whether they need a surveillance system at all.  Installation should be 
based not on whether federal or state funds are available but a fair assessment of 
whether public surveillance of an area is actually needed to address a real safety 
or security concern.  Any surveillance program should be closely tailored to the 
publicly stated governmental purpose supporting it.267 This tailoring should 
include the degree of surveillance sophistication needed to serve official purposes.  
Biometrics and other invasive technologies should be rarely, if ever, used to 
monitor public places.   
 
Permanent surveillance of the sort currently operated by the National Park 
Service should also not be used in public places.268 Its use is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the history, tradition, and functions of places like the National 
Mall.  Even in the ordinary public square, always- or usually-on surveillance 
cameras should not be implemented absent a clear and publicly justified safety 
concern.  Again, there must be public input as to any proposed surveillance.  
 
265 See SUNSTEIN, supra note – (proposing, among other things, government subsidies to help 
resolve the problem of citizen filtering and isolation). 
266 See Slobogin, supra note – at 286-312 (proposing adoption of measures to implement right to 
public anonymity).      
267 For a comprehensive list of suggestions for public surveillance programs, see The Constitution 
Project, Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance:  A Guide To Protecting Communities And 
Preserving Civil Liberties 15 (2006), available at www.constitutionproject.org .
268 Id. at 16. 
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Public debate regarding any such programs should include serious consideration 
of their effects on public liberties like expression and association.269 
As importantly, citizens should have assurances that the public data trails 
they leave behind are not being collected, stored, mined, or used for improper 
purposes.  This observation applies to Muni WiFi programs and surveillance 
camera programs alike.  It is not enough that municipalities commit not to mine 
private data.  Officials must consider protocols and regulations for the storage, 
retention, and retrieval of public WiFi data.  With respect to both Muni WiFi and 
public surveillance programs, officials should create technological and 
administrative safeguards that will encrypt publicly transmitted data, limit access 
to that data, and provide clear guidelines for non-law enforcement access to 
surveillance records.270 Once again, adoption of these protocols and regulations 
should be the result of an open public process.    
 
Public transparency and accountability will not ensure that expressive and 
associate chill or the sanitizing of public places will not occur.  But these are 
minimal steps that can and should be taken to assure citizens that public places 
remain open to identity claims and participatory self-governance.271 It is 
unfortunate that surprisingly few governments have taken any of these steps to 
date.272 The National Park Service, for example, has neither sought public input 
with respect to its surveillance practices on the National Mall and other critical 
public properties nor disclosed the nature or extent of that surveillance program to 
the public.  It is precisely this sort of lack of transparency that will lead to 
avoidance and purification of public places.   
 
3.  Protest Tactics, “Sousveillance,” and Civil Disobedience 
 
Even with these safeguards, we will sometimes be watched when we are 
in public.  We cannot rely solely on governments to provide transparency.  Public 
places are ultimately a matter of public responsibility.  Just as civil rights 
protesters experimented with the sit-in and other expressive actions in response to 
official controls, so too must the modern citizen think and act more creatively to 
preserve spaces for public expressive activity.     
 
As mentioned earlier, technological advances associated with the 
networking of public places might be used to the advantage of public protesters 
and demonstrators.273 With always-on public wireless networks and personal 
 
269 See id. at 18-19 (discussing constitutional concerns and “social costs” of surveillance).  
270 See id. at 20 (encouraging adoption of surveillance protocols and controls). 
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computing devices, speakers and assembles can engage in “swarming” and other 
tactical maneuvers that will render public displays more effective.274 The power 
of computer-enhanced social networking can be used to counteract some of the 
most severe official regulations on public assembly and expression, including 
material space restrictions on movement and spontaneity.  Speakers will be able 
to communicate with one another over vast public spaces, in real time.  Official 
tactics for controlling public protests and demonstrations, including corralling and 
zoning public speakers, might be thwarted or at least challenged by counter-
tactics like “snake marches” and spontaneous counter-movements.275 
Smarter protests are not the only advance that may limit the repressive 
effects of spatial networking.  As mentioned, an army of citizen-journalists will 
occupy networked public places.  Their cameras will create an “unofficial” record 
of what occurred before, during, and after public expressive events.  On the 
pragmatic front, this may serve as crucial evidence when protesters seek to defend 
themselves from charges of breaching the peace, disorderly conduct, or resisting 
arrest.276 More generally, however, it may restore public confidence in the ability 
to act out and up in public without fearing that an “official” record of events will 
be the only record available in subsequent proceedings.  Private surveillance will 
contribute to public regulatory transparency, as the police and other officials are 
themselves constrained by surveillance.   
 
The use of cameras at protests is merely one form of “sousveillance,” or 
surveillance from below. Electrical engineers and sociologists are currently 
partnering to design wearable computers that in effect watch our official 
watchers.277 This inverse or counter-surveillance resituates the technologies of 
surveillance, essentially turning the tables on authorities.  Sousveillance does not 
eliminate public surveillance.  But it may encourage people to engage and dispute 
 
274 See RHEINGOLD, supra note – at 157-58 (discussing instances in which “smart mobs” used 
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rather than fear and thus avoid public surveillance – and public places.  It signals 
to authorities that citizens are aware of but not intimidated by the presence of 
surveillance devices.  In this sense sousveillance can be an empowering activity.                       
 
Recording events and publishing them to the Web in real space and time 
will also permit protesters to bypass media filters that tend to distort protest 
messages.  Citizen-journalists can create and publish a Web page as events 
unfold.  Members of an assembly can determine the content of these presentations 
as well as their focus as published.  
 
In addition to engaging in their own forms of counter-surveillance, 
citizens can also resist technologies through non-compliance and even in some 
cases active interference with cameras.278 They can, for example, force 
governmental transparency by sharing information on the Web about the location 
of surveillance cameras.  A creative group known as the Surveillance Camera 
Players uses a form of street theatre to highlight and expose the location and 
operation of cameras in New York City.279 This very mild form of civil 
disobedience actually uses a combination of public speech, assembly, and 
network technology to impose transparency on public surveillance programs. 
 
New restrictions on public expression call for new tactics of resistance.  
Counter-surveillance and public awareness campaigns can be effective in drawing 
attention to and imposing transparency on public surveillance systems.  This may 
provide some assurance and confidence to public protesters otherwise concerned 
about the repressive effects of networked public places.     
 
4.  Laws, Norms, and Architectures 
 
How the networking of public places ultimately affects public expressive 
behavior will ultimately depend upon some combination of laws, social norms, 
and architectures.280 Legislators could of course pass new laws to deal with 
things live “drive-by pornography,” public spamming, and new forms of cyber-
stalking.  Citizens might adjust their behaviors to take the effects of new 
technologies on public life into account.  Engineers could create products that 
facilitate selective receipt of speech and permit surveillance without destroying 
public liberties.     
 
278 See Gary Marx, A Tack in the Shoe:  Neutralizing and Resisting the New Surveillance, 59 (2) 
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES 369-90 (2003) (discussing a host of tactics people can use to 
neutralize and resist efforts to collect personal information).  
279 The players are described on their website, www.notbored.org.
280 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 121-22 (1999) (noting that 
law, social norms, architecture, and the market regulate social behavior). 
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If there is one clear lesson from the analysis of networked places in this 
Article it is that laws will be increasingly ineffective in terms of regulating public 
expression.  In many cases networked expression will be too slippery to be 
regulated, too disconnected from material places to be effectively policed.  
Enacting new laws will not preserve the democratic functions of public places.  
Norms and architectures will be far more effective than laws in terms of 
protecting us from harmful public speech and preserving public anonymity.281 
We will all have to learn to live with the thrusting of expression we find 
offensive and distasteful.  This will require honing our ability to selectively 
consume information.  It will require some community policing of public places – 
parents shielding children from sexually explicit information, and public shaming 
of “dirty drivers” and consumers of pornography in public parks and on public 
subways, trains, and buses.282 Like the traditional press, citizen-journalists armed 
with cameras and recorders will have to exercise restraint in training their devices 
on private actors in public places.  We will all have to become more mindful that 
in casting our eyes downward and plugging our ears, we are destroying aspects of 
the public expressive culture.           
 
Most important, perhaps, will be the architectures of computer codes for 
the devices we wear and carry and the environment we will inhabit.  The key will 
be to design codes that will simultaneously facilitate the open exchange of 
information and monitor space in a fashion that preserves that same openness.  
Software engineers and the architectures they construct will be far more important 
to networked expressive culture than legislative or executive decrees. 283 These 
architectures will establish protocols of protection from unwanted or harassing 
public expression delivered from mobile devices.  They will permit us to 
authenticate our identity or mask it.      
 
Governments are responsible for taking expressive liberties into account 
as they commission new systems and digitize the public environment.  We are all 
of course responsible for using products and programs in a manner that preserves 
public expressive liberties.  As compelling as our own sound tracks may be, we 
must recognize that we miss much by heavily filtering our public experiences.   
 
Of course, none of these rather modest proposals will guarantee a return to 
public places or a robust public expressive culture there.  But as public places 
 
281 See Blitz, supra note – at 718 (noting that preserving expressive liberties in public spaces is  
often “a question of architectural design and planning rather than First Amendment law”).  
282 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 13 (1986) ( noting that social controls like  
ridicule, humiliation, and social shunning are often effectively used to regulate offensive 
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283 See Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 136-39 (proposing various design features to make 
surveillance at malls more transparent). 
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become networked, we must begin to consider how we might preserve the 
identity, self-governance, and transparency functions of public places.   
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
We have arrived at a critical period of transition in terms of public places 
and public expression.  The material places we have traditionally occupied -- and 
which have substantially influenced norms, expectations, and legal doctrines 
relating to public expression -- are becoming highly networked.  As a result, 
traditional distinctions between “private” and “public” speech, and “online” and 
“offline” presence, are rapidly fading into extinction.     
 
The First Amendment implications of the progression toward networked 
public places are serious.  Much depends on the scope and use of technological 
advances.  Already, however, we can be relatively certain that public citizens will 
become more captive to certain forms of unwanted expression, more known (or at 
least knowable) to governmental authorities as they gather and speak in public, 
and less and less personally engaged in expressive communion with one another 
in public places.  There are pressing questions with regard to whether, and if so 
how, old First Amendment doctrines and principles might be transported into 
modernized places.   
 
Of even larger concern are the prospects for continued self-governance 
through and in public places.  Reducing the spaces of “offline” presence by 
providing public wireless networks may replenish public places to some degree.  
But the people there will be less connected as a result of the pervasive personal 
computing they will bring with them.  The squares and parks they will occupy 
will likely be even more purified and sterile than the commercialized malls many 
public places have already become.  Certain marginalized groups and activities 
may be even less welcome in networked public places than they have been in 
traditional material ones.       
 
We cannot reverse the progression toward networked public places.  The 
forces trending in this direction are much too strong.  The features of public place 
networking that are most threatening to public expression can, however, be 
managed.  If the public square is to be networked, then governments must 
concentrate on expanding access to crucial means of public communication, both 
in terms of wireless access and the tools that ensure public connectivity.  Citizens 
must press officials to make the networking of public places a more transparent 
and politically legitimate process.  They must also learn to use new technologies 
to enhance their own expressive liberties.  Public citizens must use 
communication devices responsibly such that they do not infringe on the public 
liberties of others.  In networked public places, formal laws and constitutional 
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principles will matter less to the scope of expressive liberties than will new 
computer codes and the behavioral norms that shape their applications.    
